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Comparative Perspectives on Strategic 
Remedial Delays 
Holning Lau* 
In controversial constitutional cases, courts sometimes grant the government an 
extended period of time to correct rights violations—what I call “remedial grace periods”—
hoping that the postponed implementation of change will temper backlash.  The most well-
known example of such remedial delay followed the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education II.  This Article spotlights a more recent remedial grace period.  In 
Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, South Africa’s highest court ruled that depriving same-sex 
couples of marriage was unconstitutional.  It could have implemented same-sex marriage 
immediately by reading it into the law, but it chose not to.  Instead, it sought to defuse 
controversy by giving Parliament time to remedy the situation legislatively.  Fourie’s grace 
period complicates prevailing wisdom about grace periods that derives from Brown II. 
Part I of this Article provides background by comparing remedial grace periods to other 
judicial delay tactics.  Part II looks closely at Fourie.  Through a content analysis of newspaper 
stories and interviews with rights activists, I examined the Fourie grace period’s effectiveness 
at addressing backlash.  The grace period appears to have mitigated backlash by enhancing the 
perceived legitimacy of the Constitutional Court and of same-sex marriage.  Whereas previous 
commentators have focused on Brown II’s grace period and derided its failure to mitigate 
backlash, the South African grace period is much more commendable.  By presenting an in-
depth account of the Fourie grace period, this Article helps to develop a fuller picture of 
remedial grace periods.  Part III examines how the South African experience can inform 
judicial behavior in other parts of the world. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Conventional wisdom says that judges act strategically to 
mitigate backlash against the judiciary and its decisions concerning 
controversial social issues.1  Recent attention has focused on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s strategic behaviors with respect to same-sex 
marriage.  Realists believe that the Court strategically delayed 
deciding the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans.  Prior to 
                                                 
 1. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 12-17 
(1998) (explaining that judges act strategically based on the preferences of other actors); 
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009) (describing ways 
in which public opinion influences judicial interpretation of the Constitution); Cass R. 
Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 155, 157 (2007) (“But there can be no question that the Court’s decisions can provoke 
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legalizing same-sex marriage nationwide in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 the 
Court avoided other opportunities to decide the issue by denying 
grants of certiorari and dismissing Hollingsworth v. Perry on 
procedural grounds.3  Many people believed that the Court would 
eventually rule in favor of marriage equality, but was dodging that 
ruling because of the backlash it could engender.4  As public support 
for same-sex marriage steadily grew over time, the magnitude of 
potential backlash diminished.5  Thus, the Court had an interest in 
postponing deciding the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans.  
Among sitting judges, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg has spoken most 
publicly about the benefits of strategic delay.6  She stated that the 
                                                 
 2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  Prior to Obergefell, forty-seven states had extended 
marriage rights to same-sex couples.  Obergefell required the rest of the country to legalize 
same-sex marriage as well.  See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same-Sex 
Marriage a Right Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html (noting that Obergefell required 
thirteen states to cease banning same-sex marriage).  Throughout this Article, I adopt the 
commonly used phrase “legalize same-sex marriage” as a shorthand to describe government 
decisions to start recognizing same-sex marriage as legally valid, which is not to suggest that 
it was previously a crime for same-sex couples to marry through religious or cultural 
ceremonies that had no legal effect. 
 3. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 271 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
265 (2014). 
 4. While we are unable to enter the justices’ minds to ascertain their true intentions, 
many realists believe that some justices who ruled in favor of same-sex marriage in 
Obergefell avoided earlier opportunities to do so because of concerns about backlash.  On 
strategic avoidance as an explanation for dismissing Hollingsworth on procedural grounds, 
see, for example, Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial 
Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 144-46 (2013); Douglas NeJaime, The View from Below: 
Public Interest Lawyering, Social Change, and Adjudication, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 
182, 196 (2013).  For discussions about strategic reasons for denying certiorari in same-sex 
marriage cases, see, for example, Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Lets Stand State Rulings 
Allowing Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-lets-stand-state-rulings-allowing-same-sex-marriage/ 
2014/10/06/9991bbb6-4d89-11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_story.html; Adam Liptak, Supreme 
Court Delivers Tacit Win to Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/10/07/us/denying-review-justices-clear-way-for-gay-marriage-in-5-states.html?_r=0; 
Dahlia Lithwick, The Right Outcome for the Wrong Reasons, SLATE (Oct. 6, 2014, 3:59 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/10/supreme_court_gay_
marriage_cases_the_court_misses_its_moment_to_rule_on.html. 
 5. See Andrew R. Flores, Examining Variation in Surveying Attitudes on Same-Sex 
Marriage: A Meta-Analysis, 79 PUB. OPINION Q. 580, 590 (2015) (presenting polling data 
that show growing support for same-sex marriage). 
 6. See Nancy Scherer, Viewing the Supreme Court’s Marriage Cases Through the 
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Court’s landmark abortion rights decision in Roe v. Wade was correct 
in principle but provoked backlash by moving “too far, too fast.”7  
Justice Ginsburg’s comments implied that a slower approach to 
marriage equality was therefore wise.8 
 While the strategy of delaying rulings has been widely discussed, 
this Article shifts our gaze to a different tactic: delaying remedies.  
Various courts around the world have adopted remedial grace periods, 
but this approach remains poorly understood.9  South Africa offers a 
paradigmatic example of the remedial grace period.  Like the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court of South Africa acted 
strategically in dealing with same-sex marriage, but in a different way.  
In 2005, the court ruled that denying same-sex couples the ability to 
marry violated rights to equality and dignity.10  The court could have 
implemented same-sex marriage immediately by “reading in” 
language to South Africa’s Marriage Act to render its definition of 
marriage gender-neutral, but the court chose instead to grant 
Parliament a one-year grace period to remedy the constitutional 
violations through legislative reform.11  Parliament eventually passed a 
bill to legalize same-sex marriage, and Deputy President Phumzile 
Mlambo-Ngcuka signed it into law.12  My research examines whether 
and how the grace period defused backlash against the court and the 
legalization of same-sex marriage. 
                                                                                                             
remarks made by Justice Ginsburg at Columbia University Law School and the University of 
Chicago Law School). 
 7. Id. (quoting Justice Ginsburg); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on 
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381-82 (1985) 
(“[I]n my judgment, Roe ventured too far in the change it ordered.  The sweep and detail of 
the opinion stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-life movement and an attendant reaction 
in Congress and state legislatures.”).  But cf. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before 
(and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2030-34 
(2011) (contending that commentators have overstated the backlash caused by Roe). 
 8. Although Justice Ginsburg did not explicitly draw parallels between abortion and 
same-sex marriage, “the connection could not have been lost on [her] audience.”  Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Justice Ginsburg, Roe v. Wade and Same-Sex Marriage, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG 
(May 12, 2013, 11:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ geoffrey-r-stone/justice-
ginsburg-roe-v-wa_b_3264307.html; see also Barnes, supra note 4 (quoting Justice Ginsburg 
saying that there was “no urgency” for the Court to rule on same-sex marriage). 
 9. When a court grants the government an extended period of time to remedy a 
rights deprivation, I refer to that time as a “remedial grace period.”  I use this phrase 
generically to cover various cases around the world, including cases in which courts 
themselves do not use the phrase to describe what they are doing. 
 10. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 114 (S. Afr.). 
 11. Id. at paras. 136, 161. 
 12. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.).  Deputy President Mlambo-Ngcuka signed 
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 This Article fills a gap in the existing literature because, even 
though much has been written about strategic judicial behavior, very 
little research examines the effectiveness of grace periods at 
mitigating backlash.13  Most scholarship on the effectiveness of 
strategic delays focuses on Brown v. Board of Education II, in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the integration of racially 
segregated schools should proceed with “all deliberate speed,” thereby 
creating a flexible grace period for desegregation.14  While 
commentators have largely disparaged Brown II’s grace period, my 
research suggests that the South African grace period is much more 
commendable.15  This Article presents a fuller picture of remedial 
grace periods, complicating existing understandings of how they 
operate. 
 By understanding the grace period in South Africa’s marriage 
case, we can better understand how grace periods might operate in 
other contexts.  Courts around the world are increasingly adopting 
grace periods.  In Canada, grace periods have become quite 
common.16  For example, the Supreme Court of Canada recently 
concluded that certain criminal laws violated sex workers’ rights, and 
it granted Parliament a year to pursue relevant legislative reform.17  
Earlier, some Canadian provincial courts adopted grace periods in 
                                                 
 13. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial 
Decisions, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 341 (2010) (reviewing literature on strategic judicial 
behavior). 
 14. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II ), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).  For a rare 
examination of the effectiveness of remedial delay outside the context of Brown II, see Tonja 
Jacobi, Sharing the Love: The Political Power of Remedial Delay in Same-Sex Marriage 
Cases, 15 L. & SEXUALITY 11 (2006) (examining the grace period following Massachusetts’s 
same-sex marriage ruling).  For a discussion of Jacobi’s findings, see infra notes 94-97 and 
accompanying text. 
 15. For critiques of Brown II’s remedial delay, see DERRICK BELL, SILENT 
COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL 
REFORM 95-107 (2004); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 313-20 (2004); CHARLES J. 
OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION xiii (2004); Jim Chen, Mayteenth, 89 MINN. L. REV. 203, 
219-21 (2004); H. Jefferson Powell, Enslaved to Judicial Supremacy?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1197, 1201-02 (1993) (reviewing ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992)).  
But see BURT, supra 301-03 (defending Brown II’s remedial delay). 
 16. See Kent Roach, Remedial Consensus and Dialogue under the Charter: General 
Declarations and Delayed Declarations of Invalidity, 35 U.B.C. L. REV. 211, 218-20 (2002) 
(discussing the increased frequency of remedial delays in Canadian human rights cases). 
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their same-sex marriage decisions.18  Similarly, the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia issued a grace period in its first same-sex 
marriage case.19  More recently, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal 
adopted a grace period in its landmark transgender marriage case.20  
The South African experience sheds light on these cases and on 
remedial grace periods that may emerge in the future. 
 The remainder of this Article is divided into three primary parts.  
Part II develops a three-part typology of strategic delays—delaying 
rulings, delaying rights recognition, and delaying remedies—to 
illustrate how remedial grace periods relate to other judicial delay 
tactics.  This Part also reviews the small body of existing literature on 
remedial grace periods, much of which is critical of remedial delays. 
 Part III turns to the case study of same-sex marriage in South 
Africa.  I begin by introducing the consolidated cases of Minister of 
Home Affairs v. Fourie and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. 
Minister of Home Affairs, often referred to collectively as the Fourie 
case.21  After explaining how the Fourie decision provided a grace 
period, I investigate whether and how the grace period succeeded in 
limiting backlash against the court and the legalization of same-sex 
marriage.  I initially expected that the grace period would be 
ineffective at limiting backlash.  I suspected that throughout the grace 
period the public would dwell on the court’s decision in Fourie and 
continue to deride it as judicial overreach.22  Human rights advocates 
had denounced the grace period as an unwarranted delay of justice, 
                                                 
 18. Halpern v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2002] O.J. No. 2714 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); 
EGALE Can. Inc. v. Canada (Att’y Gen.) (2001), 95 B.C.L.R. 3d 122 (Can. B.C. S.C.), aff’d, 
(2003) 13 B.C.L.R. 4th 1 (Can. B.C. C.A.). But see Halpern v. Canada (Att’y Gen.) (2003), 
65 O.R. 3d 161 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (affirming lower court’s protection of the right to same-sex 
marriage, but rejecting the remedial grace period). 
 19. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-
577/11 (Colom.). While I was finalizing this Article for publication, a second same-sex 
marriage case was pending before the Colombian Constitutional Court.  See Sibylla 
Brodzinsky & Jo Tuckman, Colombia: The Next Battleground in the Global Fight for 
Marriage Equality, GUARDIAN (July 9, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2015/jul/09/colombia-same-sex-marriage-decision-latin-america. 
 20. W. v. Registrar of Marriages, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 112 (C.F.A.) (H.K.). 
 21. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 22. For examples of criticisms targeting the court immediately after it decided 
Fourie, see Brandon Bailey, Letter to the Editor, Gay Marriage Ruling Reflects Un-African 
Values, SOWETAN (S. Afr.), Dec. 7, 2005, at 12; William Dicks, Letter to the Editor, 
Marriage Exists Between a Man and a Woman, CAPE ARGUS (S. Afr.), Dec. 5, 2005, at 11; 
Raymond Thomas, Letter to the Editor, Once Moral Laws Go, We Return to Dark Ages, 
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echoing critiques of the grace period that followed Brown II.23  At the 
outset of my project, I found myself moved by such critiques.  My 
research sought to investigate the merits of these inclinations. 
 To the best of my knowledge, this Article offers the first in-depth 
examination of the grace period’s impact on South Africans’ 
perceptions of the judiciary and same-sex marriage.  My research is 
based on a content analysis of 215 South African newspaper articles 
covering same-sex marriage and interviews I conducted with South 
African human rights advocates.  Contrary to what I expected at the 
start of my research, my case study ultimately found that the remedial 
grace period did in fact defuse criticisms of the court.  It also 
enhanced the perceived legitimacy of same-sex marriage. 
 Part IV examines the South African case study’s implications 
beyond South Africa.  It explores how the case study can inform 
discussions about whether remedial grace periods are justifiable, or 
even desirable, in various contexts around the world.  While the case 
study suggests that the grace period worked well at mitigating 
backlash in South Africa, there can be difficulties replicating that 
success in other contexts.  This Part examines the factors that can 
contribute to, or detract from, the appeal of remedial grace periods.  It 
then focuses specifically on Europe, presenting a thought experiment 
on how grace periods could improve the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights.24  Perhaps somewhat 
counterintuitively, the thought experiment illustrates how, in some 
situations, a court can accelerate the delivery of justice by adopting a 
remedial grace period. 
II. STRATEGIC JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 
 This Part begins with a primer on strategic judicial behavior.  
Afterwards, I develop a three-part typology of strategic delay 
tactics—delaying rulings, delaying rights recognition, and delaying 
remedies—focusing extra attention on remedial delays. 
                                                 
 23. See Pierre de Vos, Difference and Belonging: The Constitutional Court and the 
Adoption of the Civil Union Act, in TO HAVE AND TO HOLD: THE MAKING OF SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE IN SOUTH AFRICA 29 (Melanie Judge, Anthony Manion & Shaun de Waal eds., 
2008) (discussing how “[c]onstitutional lawyers and LGBTI activists rallied against this 
Bill”). 
 24. This section builds on my earlier writing on the European Court of Human Rights 
case Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010.  See Holning Lau, Rewriting 
Schalk and Kopf: Shifting the Locus of Deference, in DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN HUMAN 





266 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:259 
 
A. Judges and Political Constraints 
 In principle, the judiciary is expected to rise above politics and 
apply legal principles without concern for whether its decisions please 
the public.  The iconic image of the goddess Justitia embodies this 
ideal.  The blindfold that she wears while balancing her scale 
represents the objectivity and independence of the judiciary.25  In 
reality, however, a robust literature shows that judges are not blind to 
how their decisions are perceived.26 
 Judges care about public perceptions because the public can 
constrain the power of an unpopular court.27  For elected judges, the 
public can punish them by voting them off the court.  Even for judges 
who are not elected but are instead appointed for life, the political 
branches of government can constrain their power.  For example, the 
political branches might refuse to cooperate in the implementation of 
court decisions, as was the case when states refused to desegregate 
schools after Brown v. Board of Education.28  The political branches 
might curtail judicial power even more aggressively.  For example, the 
U.S. Congress can strip the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction if 
it wishes to punish the Court for unpopular decisions.29 
 An even more extraordinary threat to judicial power is the 
specter of court packing.  When the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated 
several of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s popular New Deal 
measures, he proposed legislation to increase the number of justices 
                                                 
 25. See JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, 
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011) 
(describing objectivity as one of the values expressed by Justitia’s blindfold); see also 
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 158 & n.13 (referencing sources that suggest the judiciary “should 
interpret the Constitution without attention to the possible objections of the public”). 
 26. E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 1; FRIEDMAN, supra note 1; Epstein & Jacobi, 
supra note 13. 
 27. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 26. 
 28. Matthew E.K. Hall, The Semiconstrained Court: Public Opinion, the Separation 
of Powers, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fear of Nonimplementation, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
352 (2014); see also Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (directing lower courts to 
implement school desegregation “with all deliberate speed”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 
I ) , 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in schools was unconstitutional). 
 29. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction shall be subject to “such Exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2.  For discussions about limitations on Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping 
powers, see, for example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. 
L. REV. 1043 (2010); James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the 
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on the Court, which would allow him to appoint up to six additional 
justices who favored New Deal reforms.30  Although this so-called 
court-packing bill never passed, discussion of the bill seemed to place 
enough pressure on the Court to influence its jurisprudence.31  The 
Court changed direction, viewing New Deal provisions much more 
favorably.32  While court packing never materialized in the United 
States, it did in South Africa.  To protect apartheid policies in the early 
1950s, South Africa’s National Party added five new judicial seats to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals.33  This ensured that the court would 
not stray too far from the National Party’s apartheid ideology.34 
 Judges care not only about efforts to constrain their power, but 
also about political opposition to causes that they support.  For 
example, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has been an outspoken 
advocate of women’s rights and was a cofounder of the American 
Civil Liberties Union’s Women’s Rights Project.35  While she believes 
that Roe v. Wade was correct in principle, she laments that the case 
provoked backlash by moving “too far, too fast.”36  Justice Ginsburg 
believes that Roe gave “opponents of access to abortion a target to 
aim at relentlessly” and that the decision “seemed to have stopped the 
momentum that was on the side of change.”37  The conventional 
wisdom is that Roe galvanized social conservatives who have now 
succeeded in chipping away at Roe’s rights protections through 
subsequent litigation and legislative reforms.38  The fact that judicial 
                                                 
 30. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 132-37 (1995). 
 31. See id.  Some scholars have argued that factors beyond the threat of court-
packing help to explain the Supreme Court’s ultimate jurisprudential support of New Deal 
policies.  E.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW 
DEAL 33-43 (2000). 
 32. This jurisprudential shift helped to repair the public’s image of the Supreme 
Court.  See Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR’s Court-
Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139, 1149-50 (1987). 
 33. WJ HOSTEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 
626-30 (1977). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Nadine Strossen, The American Civil Liberties Union and Women’s Rights, 
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1950-54 (1991) (celebrating Justice Ginsburg’s work at the 
ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project). 
 36. See Scherer, supra note 6 (quoting Justice Ginsburg). 
 37. Id. at 1151 (quoting Justice Ginsburg). 
 38. See e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements 
and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 520 (2001) (asserting that Roe “undermine[d 
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protection of certain rights could mobilize opposition against such 
rights can be troubling to judges, creating incentives for judges to 
avoid moving “too far, too fast.”39 
 The issue of same-sex marriage offers illustrative examples of 
judicial actions triggering backlash.  Consider the 1993 Hawaii 
Supreme Court case of Baehr v. Lewin.40  The court ruled that same-
sex couples’ inability to marry warranted strict scrutiny, one of the 
most stringent forms of constitutional review, and the court remanded 
the case.41  By requiring strict scrutiny, the court positioned Hawaii to 
become the first jurisdiction in the world to legalize same-sex 
marriage.  On remand, the trial court held that Hawaii’s ban on same-
sex marriage failed strict scrutiny.42  The state appealed, but the 
unpopularity of Hawaii’s judicial decisions pushed the political 
process to outpace litigation.  While the state’s appeal was pending, 
opponents of same-sex marriage mobilized to pass a constitutional 
amendment that stripped the courts of power to decide the 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans.43  Moreover, the Baehr 
decision galvanized national opposition to same-sex marriage, 
resulting in the passage of the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) and numerous same-sex marriage bans in states across the 
country.44  For a more recent example of backlash, we can turn to 
                                                                                                             
Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1396–
1405 (2009) (describing how reproductive rights have been curtailed since Roe). 
 Recent historical research by Linda Greenhouse and Reva Siegel suggests that the 
backlash against Roe is often overstated.  See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 7; see also 
Mary Ziegler, Beyond Backlash: Legal History, Polarization, and Roe v. Wade, 71 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 969, 974 (2014) (“[S]cholars have overstated the degree to which Roe 
immediately polarized discussion.”).  Roe seems to have contributed to backlash, while the 
degree of that contribution is contested. 
 39. See Scherer, supra note 6 (quoting Justice Ginsburg’s comments on Roe). 
 40. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 41. Id. at 67-68 (stating that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage 
amounted to sex discrimination, which receives strict scrutiny under Hawaii’s state 
constitutional law). 
 42. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *4-9 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 
1996).  
 43. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 WL 35643448, at 
*1-3 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999) (stating that the constitutional amendment rendered the plaintiffs’ 
complaint moot); see also Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Sylvia A. Law, Baehr v. Lewin and 
the Long Road to Marriage Equality, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 705, 716-18 (2011) (discussing 
Hawaiian same-sex marriage case). 
 44. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996), invalidated by United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2-3 (1996), as 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906-07 (naming Baehr v. Lewin as an underlying 
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Iowa, where the state supreme court unanimously decided to legalize 
same-sex marriage in Varnum v. Brien.45  Iowans retaliated against the 
court by dismissing the three justices who sought reelection in 2010.46 
B. Delaying Rulings and Delaying Rights Recognition 
 Judges sometimes adjust their behaviors due to the fact that the 
public and its political representatives can punish the judiciary for 
unpopular decisions.47  Delay tactics are a means through which 
judges seek to mitigate backlash.  Judges can resort to delaying 
rulings, delaying rights recognition, or delaying remedies.  This 
section will focus on the first two of these three tactics.  Same-sex 
marriage litigation is a lens through which we can observe these 
strategic behaviors.  Conventional wisdom is that the U.S. Supreme 
Court delayed ruling on whether the federal Constitution requires 
states to legalize same-sex marriage.48  In 2015, the Court ruled in 
Obergefell v. Hodges that states must legalize same-sex marriage.49  
Prior to Obergefell, the Court declined other opportunities to decide 
the issue.  It did so by exercising its discretionary power to deny 
certiorari on same-sex marriage cases.50  It also dodged the merits of 
the constitutional claim to same-sex marriage in 2013 by dismissing 
Hollingsworth v. Perry on procedural grounds.51  To be sure, one 
might argue that the dismissal was animated purely by doctrinal 
                                                                                                             
state to legalize same-sex marriage, three states in addition to Hawaii passed constitutional 
amendments to ban same-sex marriage and thirty-eight states adopted statutory bans on 
same-sex marriage.  For a list of these bans, see Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition 
of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 
2165-94 (2005). 
 45. 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 46. Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of Three 
Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 715, 715-17 (2011); see generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM 
THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE (2013) (discussing the backlash generated by Baehr and Varnum). 
 47. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 26. 
 48. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 4; NeJaime, supra note 4; Barnes, supra note 4; 
Liptak, supra note 4; Lithwick, supra note 4. 
 49. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 50. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 
(2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); 
Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); Kitchen 
v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).  For 
commentary suggesting that the denials of certiorari were a form of strategic delay, see, for 
example, Barnes, supra note 4; Liptak, supra note 4; Lithwick, supra note 4. 
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dictates.  The political realist explanation, however, is that the Court 
decided not to reach the merits of the case for strategic reasons.52 
 Public support for same-sex marriage had been rapidly growing 
around the time of Hollingsworth.53  According to the Pew Research 
Center, public support for same-sex marriage rose from 48% in 2012, 
the year that the Court heard Hollingsworth, to 57% in 2015, the year 
that the Court decided Obergefell.54  While the Supreme Court 
delayed ruling on nationwide same-sex marriage, it nudged lower 
courts toward ruling in favor of same-sex marriage.  It did so through 
United States v. Windsor.55  Windsor invalidated section 3 of DOMA, 
which banned the federal government from recognizing same-sex 
marriages that were already recognized by state governments.56  
Windsor did not address whether the Constitution required states 
nationwide to legalize same-sex marriage, but the Windsor opinion 
contained dicta that clearly favored same-sex marriage.57 
 Influenced by Windsor’s reasoning and rhetoric, lower courts 
legalized same-sex marriage in twenty-three states by invalidating 
same-sex marriage bans.58  In addition, three states legalized same-sex 
marriage by legislative means during the time between the Windsor 
                                                 
 52. Klarman, supra note 4; NeJaime, supra note 4.  For a classic example of the U.S. 
Supreme Court delaying a ruling on the merits for strategic reasons, consider the interracial 
marriage case of Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), as described by ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 174 
(1962).  See also Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 431, 446-50 (2005) (describing Naim). 
 53. See Flores, supra note 5. 
 54. Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (May 12, 2016), http:// 
www.pewforum.org/2016/05/12/ changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/. 
 55. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2931 
(2015); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); 
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Kitchen 
v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); Rolando v. 
Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Mont. 2014); Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (D. Ariz. 
2014); Hamby v. Parnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (D. Alaska 2014); Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. 
Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014); 
Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014); Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21620 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 
1065 (D. Haw. 2012); Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036 (N.J. 2013); see also Neil 
S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System: Racial Segregation, 
Reapportionment, and Obergefell Appendix A, 70 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(characterizing Windsor as an important influence on subsequent cases that invalidated same-
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and Obergefell rulings.59  As a result, same-sex marriage was legal in 
thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia by the time the 
Supreme Court decided Obergefell, whereas only eleven states and 
the District of Columbia had legalized same-sex marriage when the 
Court decided Hollingsworth.60  This corpus of lower court decisions 
helped to mitigate allegations that the majority in Obergefell engaged 
in unsavory judicial activism.61  Indeed, when deciding Obergefell, the 
Supreme Court was not at the vanguard of change.  Rather, it was 
demanding that thirteen laggard states join the rest of the country in 
legalizing same-sex marriage.62  The strategic delay that preceded 
Obergefell placed the Court in a much less controversial position than 
it would be in if it had legalized same-sex marriage earlier. 
 Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court delayed its same-sex marriage 
ruling, courts can instead issue a ruling but delay the recognition of 
rights.  For brevity, I will call this “delaying rights.”  Schalk & Kopf v. 
Austria, a case decided by the European Court of Human Rights, is an 
example of delaying rights.63  In Schalk & Kopf, the court reached the 
merits of the dispute and ruled that the European Convention on 
Human Rights did not require member states to legalize same-sex 
marriage—not yet.64  The court acknowledged that it was likely to 
recognize a right to same-sex marriage in the future.65 
 The court has long recognized that the European Convention on 
Human Rights is a living document and, therefore, its rights 
protections evolve over time.66  The reasoning in Schalk & Kopf is 
anchored to the court’s consensus doctrine.67  In short, the court 
                                                 
 59. Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Delaware legalized same-sex marriage 
legislatively during this time.  See Timeline Gay Marriage Chronology, L.A. TIMES (June 26, 
2015), http://graphics.latimes.com/usmap-gay-marriage-chronology/ (showing an interactive 
timeline of the legalization of same-sex marriage across the United States). 
 60. See id.; Liptak, supra note 2 (noting that Obergefell required thirteen states to 
cease banning same-sex marriage). 
 61. Cf. Liptak, supra note 2 (“[T]he [Supreme C]ourt had responded cautiously and 
methodically, laying judicial groundwork for a transformative decision [on same-sex 
marriage].  It waited for scores of lower courts to strike down bans on same-sex marriages 
before addressing the issue . . . .”).  To be sure, allegations of judicial activism were not 
entirely prevented.  The dissenting justices in Obergefell were quick to accuse the majority of 
judicial overreach.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting; Alito, J., dissenting). 
 62. See Liptak, supra note 2. 
 63. No. 30141/04, ECHR 2010. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at ¶ 105. 
 66. See id. 
 67. For background on the consensus doctrine, see Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-
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acknowledged that, after member states reach a relative “consensus” 
in favor of same-sex marriage, the court would require exceptional 
states to conform to the norm of same-sex marriage.68  Remarkably, 
the court stated explicitly that a consensus seemed likely to emerge in 
the near future and, thus, a right to same-sex marriage would likely be 
protected sometime soon.69 
 Scholars have explained that the European Court of Human 
Rights strategically developed its consensus doctrine to safeguard the 
court’s perceived legitimacy.70  The consensus doctrine ensures that the 
court does not step too far in front of public opinion, thus containing 
the controversy that the court attracts.  The consensus doctrine still 
allows the court to nudge member states toward finding new rights.  
In Schalk & Kopf, the court pointed to the “emerging European 
consensus” that was “rapidly” growing in favor of same-sex 
marriage.71  Highlighting this trajectory signaled to member states that 
they should legalize same-sex marriage, or else the court might rule 
against them in the near future.72 
                                                                                                             
273, 382 (1997); Holning Lau & Derek Loh, Misapplication of ECHR Jurisprudence in W v 
Registrar of Marriages, 41 H.K. L.J. 75, 79-85 (2011). 
 68. See Schalk & Kopf, no. 30141/04. 
 69. The court seemed to suggest that, if a majority of member states were to legalize 
same-sex marriage, that would constitute a consensus.  See id. ¶ 105 (“[T]here is not yet a 
majority of States providing for legal recognition of same-sex couples.  The area in question 
must therefore still be regarded as one of evolving rights with no established consensus.”). 
 70. E.g., Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Evolutive 
Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1730, 1734-45 
(2011); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 67, at 327. 
 71. Schalk & Kopf, no. 30141/04, ¶ 105. 
 72. Of course, another way to say that the European Court of Human Rights delayed 
rights recognition is to say that it denied rights recognition temporarily.  Sometimes, a court 
might strategically deny a right without signaling that it will recognize the right in the future.  
Baker v. State can be viewed as an example of strategic rights denial, as opposed to strategic 
delay.  744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).  In Baker, the Vermont Supreme Court held that same-sex 
couples have a right to legal recognition other than marriage.  This decision led to the 
creation of civil unions in Vermont, the first time a state in the United States granted any 
legal status to same-sex couples.  The court gave no indication that it would require the 
legalization of same-sex marriage in the future.  By denying the right to same-sex marriage 
and allowing civil unions as a substitute, the court struck a strategic compromise.  It seems 
that the Vermont Supreme Court sought to shield itself from the sort of backlash that the 
Hawaii Supreme Court provoked just a few years earlier in its same-sex marriage case.  For 
discussion about this strategic compromise, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY 
PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS (2002); Tonja Jacobi, Same-Sex 
Marriage in Vermont: Implications of Legislative Remand for the Judiciary’s Role, 26 VT. L. 
REV. 381, 396 (2002).  Vermont eventually legalized same-sex marriage through legislation 
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C. Remedial Delays as Strategic Behavior 
 We now turn to the third type of strategic delay, remedial delay, 
which is the primary focus of this Article.  The Brown litigation 
provides an early example of remedial delay.  In Brown I, the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized that African Americans have a right to 
attend desegregated schools based on the constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection.73  The Court did not, however, require state 
governments to integrate public schools right away.  Instead, in Brown 
II, the Court asked that schools desegregate “with all deliberate 
speed,” creating a temporal separation between rights (recognized 
now) and remedy (to be fully implemented later).74  Almost a decade 
later, the Court finally stated in Griffin v. County School Board of 
Prince Edward County that “[t]he time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ 
ha[d] run out.”75  In Griffin, the Court ordered an injunction to 
immediately integrate the Virginia schools at issue.76 
 To be clear, concern about potential backlash is not the sole 
factor behind remedial grace periods.  For clarity, it is helpful to 
recognize a distinction between what I will call “structural” factors 
and “strategic” factors.  A court might believe that there is a range of 
legitimate structural frameworks for remedying a rights violation.  If 
so, the court might grant other branches of government a grace period 
to develop the remedial framework of its choice.  For example, there 
are various tools for integrating schools, including, but not limited to, 
mandatory busing, strategic placement of new schools, and 
development of integrated magnet schools.77  In Brown II, the 
Supreme Court gave states time to choose among such administrative 
tools for structuring integrated schools.  In contexts such as school 
integration, a court might allow a grace period because developing a 
remedial structure takes time, involving policy decisions that other 
                                                 
 73. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 74. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 75. 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964) (ordering an injunction to immediately desegregate the 
Virginia public schools at issue, explaining that the Constitution did not permit the 
government to simply close its public schools in lieu of desegregation). 
 76. Id. at 232-34. 
 77. See Davison M. Douglas, The End of Busing?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1715, 1730-36 
(1997) (reviewing GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET 
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996)) (discussing policy debate concerning 
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branches of government are better at handling.78  These considerations 
are what I call “structural” motivations. 
 The Supreme Court justices’ conference notes, however, suggest 
that the grace period after Brown II was not motivated solely by 
structural concerns.79  The Court seemed worried that, even if it were 
logistically feasible to push for rapid desegregation, demanding 
integration at too quick a pace would exacerbate backlash against the 
Court and its recognition of the right to integration.80  These worries 
can explain why the Court created a weak and flexible deadline for its 
grace period, directing the government to act “with all deliberate 
speed,” instead of imposing a more concrete temporal requirement.  
Such considerations about public perceptions are what I call 
“strategic” motivations for judicial grace periods.81 
 Same-sex marriage presents a situation in which remedial delays 
seem mostly—even entirely—animated by strategic concerns.  If a 
court tells the legislature it must legalize same-sex marriage within a 
grace period or else same-sex marriage will be read into the law, the 
court is not engaging the legislature in dialogue about how to choose 
among different policy options for remedying a rights violation; 
instead, the court has already determined that same-sex marriage is 
the required remedy.82  In terms of logistics, same-sex marriage can be 
implemented quickly.  The only required administrative change is 
usually the revision of marriage application forms to render them 
                                                 
 78. For another example of structural factors, see N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).  In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
invalidated bankruptcy jurisdiction and gave Congress a one-year grace period to develop an 
alternative jurisdictional structure.  Id.  Congress was granted discretion to evaluate different 
policy options for fulfilling constitutional requirements.  Id.  Congress ultimately failed to 
meet the Supreme Court’s deadline.  See Eric S. Fish, Choosing Constitutional Remedies, 63 
UCLA L. REV. 322, 360-63 (2016) (discussing the government response to Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co.). 
 79. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND 
THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 305 (1994). 
 80. Id.; see also KLARMAN, supra note 15 (discussing the Court’s decision in Brown 
II to delay full desegregation of public schools). 
 81. In a forthcoming article, Rosalind Dixon and Samuel Issacharoff elaborate on the 
distinction between structural and strategic factors.  They refer to structural motivations for 
delay as “first-order” goals, while referring to strategic motivations as “second-order” goals.  
See Rosalind Dixon & Samuel Issacharoff, Living To Fight Another Day: Judicial Deferral 
in Defense of Democracy, 2016 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 82. Cf. Emmett Macfarlane, Dialogue or Compliance?  Measuring Legislatures’ 
Policy Responses to Court Rulings on Rights, 34 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 39, 39-51 (2012) 
(presenting data from Canada suggesting that genuine dialogue between the judicial and 
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gender-neutral.  In the United States, states that received court orders 
to implement same-sex marriage typically accomplished the task with 
ease, giving marriage licenses to same-sex couples days, if not hours, 
after final judicial rulings.83  Likewise, the government in Ontario, 
Canada began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples just 
hours after the Court of Appeal for Ontario ruled that excluding same-
sex couples from marriage violated the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.84  The Court of Appeal rejected the grace period that 
the lower court originally adopted.85  Ontario’s ability to implement 
same-sex marriage so quickly suggested that the lower court was 
motivated by strategic, not structural, reasons when it granted a two-
year grace period for implementing same-sex marriage.  Because 
remedial grace periods in the same-sex marriage context seem clearly 
motivated by strategic concerns, they present a fitting case study for 
examining whether and how grace periods influence public 
perceptions. 
 Many scholars have critiqued remedial delays.86  Most of this 
literature centers on Brown II.  While scholars applaud Brown I for 
articulating an important equality principle, they lament Brown II for 
doing more harm than good, emboldening opponents of desegregation 
to dig in their heels.87  Despite the grace period in Brown II, the 
Court’s Brown decisions still generated enormous backlash in the 
American South.88 
                                                 
 83. See Niraj Chokshi & Jeff Guo, Where Gay Marriage Stands in the States that 
Didn’t Have It, WASH. POST: GOVBEAT (June 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/06/26/where-gay-marriage-stands-in-the-states-that-didnt-have-it/ 
(“Within hours of the Supreme Court’s decision on Friday, gay couples were exercising what 
the justices said is their constitutional right to marry in states that have long denied them.”). 
 84. See Estanislao Oziewicz, Same-Sex Married Couples Rejoice, GLOBE & MAIL 
(June 11, 2003, 3:55 AM), www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/same-sex-married-
couples-rejoice/article20449572/ (noting that the City of Toronto complied with the Ontario 
Court of Appeal immediately, issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples the same 
morning that the court issued its decision). 
 85. Halpern v. Canada (Att’y Gen.) (2003), 65 O.R. 3d 161, paras. 154-56 (Can. Ont. 
C.A.). 
 86. For criticisms based on Brown II, see, for example, sources cited supra note 15.  
For criticisms from the Canadian context, see, for example, Grant R. Hoole, Proportionality 
as a Remedial Principle: A Framework for Suspended Declarations of Invalidity in Canadian 
Constitutional Law, 49 ALTA. L. REV. 107 (2011); Roach, supra note 16. 
 87. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 15. 
 88. See KLARMAN, supra note 15.  Klarman’s research suggests that Southern 
backlash against Brown eventually prompted a counter backlash from integrationists, 
spurring federal civil rights legislation to prohibit race discrimination.  See id.  This silver 
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 Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown II, other 
courts have refined the use of remedial grace periods by setting 
concrete deadlines, in contrast to the flexible deadline in Brown II.  
For example, in the South African same-sex marriage case, the 
Constitutional Court set a one-year deadline.89  Some Canadian 
superior courts adopted two-year grace periods in their same-sex 
marriage cases.90  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court allowed 
180 days for the implementation of same-sex marriage.91  Colombia 
also adopted a two-year grace period in its same-sex marriage case, 
and Hong Kong adopted a one-year grace period in its transgender 
marriage case.92  As discussed below, however, the Colombian and 
Hong Kong cases are somewhat distinguishable from the more 
straightforward same-sex marriage cases.  These two courts granted 
their respective legislatures significantly more discretion to explore 
different ways to structure their remedies.  Thus, these cases were 
arguably motivated by both structural and strategic concerns. 
 Despite the growing judicial resort to remedial delays, there has 
been very little empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of remedial 
grace periods beyond the research on Brown II.  Understanding the 
effects of grace periods is important in light of the strong normative 
claim that judges should not let politics influence their decisions.93  
Accepting that judges should generally be blind to politics, we should 
expect judges to adopt strategic remedial delays only under 
exceptional circumstances where the threat of political backlash is 
extreme and remedial delay is likely to mitigate that threat.  In this 
Article, my focus is not on developing a methodology to address the 
first part of this equation: the severity of the threat of backlash.  
Instead, my focus is on the latter part of the equation: mitigation 
effectiveness.  If there is no reason to believe that remedial delays can 
                                                 
 89. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 114 (S. Afr.). 
 90. Halpern v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2002] O.J. No. 2714, paras. 268-70 (Can. Ont. 
Sup. Ct. J.); EGALE Can. Inc. v. Canada (Att’y Gen.) (2001), 95 B.C.L.R. 3d 122 (Can. B.C. 
S.C.), aff’d, (2003) 13 B.C.L.R. 4th 1 (Can. B.C. C.A.).  But see Halpern v. Canada (Att’y 
Gen.) (2003), 65 O.R. 3d 161, paras. 154-56 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (affirming lower court’s 
protection of the right to same-sex marriage, but rejecting the remedial grace period). 
 91. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970 (Mass. 2003); see also 
Ops. of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Mass. 2004) (holding that a bill 
permitting same-sex civil unions, but banning same-sex marriages, was unconstitutional).  
 92. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-
577/11 (Colom.); W. v. Registrar of Marriages, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 112 (C.F.A.) (H.K.). 
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effectively mitigate backlash, then they should not be pursued.  Thus, 
this Article explores whether remedial delays are effective. 
 A notable exception to the dearth of relevant research is Tonja 
Jacobi’s work on the Massachusetts same-sex marriage case, 
Goodridge v. Department of Health.94  Jacobi studied national public 
opinion polls from the 180-day grace period following the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision.95  She found that 
there was a net decrease in opposition to same-sex marriage over the 
course of the grace period and, in particular, opposition diminished 
after the legislature agreed to follow the court’s instructions to 
legislate marriage equality.96  Jacobi concluded that the court was 
“able to manipulate the state’s legislative body’s influence over public 
opinion to mitigate the constraining effect of popular opposition to 
equal marriage rights.”97 
 While Jacobi’s research sheds light on remedial grace periods, 
many research questions remain unanswered.  For example, it is 
unclear whether the grace period in Massachusetts mitigated backlash 
against the court, which is not necessarily the same as backlash 
against same-sex marriage.  The public could have come to accept 
same-sex marriage while still faulting the court for judicial activism.  
In terms of methodology, Jacobi’s study was limited to data from 
Gallup’s national public opinion polls.  The South African case study 
that follows builds on Jacobi’s research by evaluating new data to 
assess the effectiveness of remedial grace periods in mitigating 
backlash against the South African Constitutional Court and backlash 
against same-sex marriage itself. 
III. SOUTH AFRICAN CASE STUDY 
 This Part presents the case study on the grace period following 
South Africa’s same-sex marriage ruling.  I begin by painting a 
backdrop to the case study by offering a brief account of the litigation 
that produced the grace period.  Next, I describe the methodology of 
the case study, and then I discuss my research findings. 
                                                 
 94. Jacobi, supra note 14. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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A. The Fourie Litigation 
 South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution has been heralded as 
one of the most rights-protective constitutions in the world.98  The 
Interim Constitution of 1993 became the first national constitution to 
explicitly ban sexual orientation discrimination, and that provision 
was later adopted in the Final Constitution of 1996.99  Gay rights 
advocates leveraged the new constitution in litigation, securing same-
sex couples’ rights in domains such as immigration, employment 
benefits, and parenting.100  Building on those precedents, the 
Constitutional Court handed down its landmark same-sex marriage 
decision in December 2005, in the consolidated cases of Minister of 
Home Affairs v. Fourie and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. 
Minister of Home Affairs, often referred to collectively as the Fourie 
decision.101  The court ruled that denying same-sex couples the “status, 
entitlements and responsibilities” of marriage violated equality and 
dignity rights enshrined in sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution.102 
 The court made history in Fourie, becoming the first national 
apex court to rule that excluding same-sex couples from marriage is 
unconstitutional.103  Scholars have discussed the thoroughness with 
                                                 
 98. E.g., Louise Arbour & Fannie Lafontaine, Beyond Self-Congratulation: The 
Charter at 25 in an International Perspective, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 239, 271 (2007) (“The 
South African Constitution is one of the most progressive and modern constitutions in the 
world, with one of the most comprehensive bills of rights.”). 
 99. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, §§ 9(3), 9(4); S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, ch. 3, 
§ 8(2). 
 100. Du Toit v. Minister of Welfare and Population Dev. 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) at 
paras. 38-42 (S. Afr.) (protecting the rights of same-sex couples to be joint legal parents of an 
adopted child); J v. Dir.-Gen., Dep’t of Home Affairs 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) at paras. 23-28 
(S. Afr.) (protecting the right of same-sex couples to become joint legal parents through 
artificial insemination); Satchwell v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) 
at paras. 8-9, 12-14 (S. Afr.) (ruling that a permanent same-sex life partner of a judge is 
entitled to the same pension benefits as a judge’s spouse); Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian 
Equal. v. Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at paras. 97-98 (S. Afr.) (holding that 
same-sex permanent life partners should have the same immigration rights as spouses). 
 101. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at paras. 48-56 (S. 
Afr.) (discussing Constitutional Court case law on the rights of same-sex couples). 
 102. Id. at para. 114. 
 103. Id.  When Fourie was decided, four other countries had legalized same-sex 
marriage nationwide: the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Canada.  All four of these 
countries did so through national legislation.  Responding to a request from the Canadian 
Government, the Supreme Court of Canada issued an advisory opinion clarifying that 
Parliament had the authority to legalize same-sex marriage nationwide; in doing so, the court 
focused on defining the scope of Parliament’s powers and did not rule on the constitutionality 
of limiting marriage to different-sex couples.  See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 
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which the majority opinion addressed the practical and symbolic 
harms of excluding same-sex couples from marriage.104  My research 
focuses on yet another remarkable aspect of the opinion: its unique 
remedy in the form of a grace period.  The court could have legalized 
same-sex marriage immediately by reading the gender-neutral term 
“spouse” into the Marriage Act.105  Instead, the court gave Parliament 
one year to remedy the situation through legislative reform.106  If, 
however, Parliament failed to correct the constitutional defects within 
a year, the word “spouse” would automatically be read into the 
Marriage Act.107  One member of the court, Justice Kate O’Regan, 
dissented.  She disagreed with the majority only with respect to its 
remedy because she preferred to grant same-sex couples immediate 
access to marriage.108 
 Why did the majority delay relief?  Justice Albert (“Albie”) 
Sachs explained: “It needs to be remembered that not only the courts 
are responsible for vindicating the rights enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights.  The legislature is in the frontline in this respect.”109  Justice 
Sachs opined that engaging the legislature could enlarge the 
government’s “institutional imprimatur” on same-sex marriage, 
thereby enhancing same-sex marriage’s legitimacy.110  Accordingly, the 
grace period “would best serve [same-sex couples’] equality claims 
by respecting the separation of powers and giving Parliament an 
opportunity to deal appropriately with the matter.”111 
 These statements reveal the court’s aim of mitigating potential 
criticism that it was disrupting the balance of power among branches 
of government.  The court also exhibited interest in fortifying the 
perceived legitimacy of same-sex marriage.  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Sachs seemed acutely aware that, despite the expansion of 
legal rights for gays and lesbians in the post-apartheid era, many, if 
                                                                                                             
including the role that lower courts played in prompting national legislation, see Peter W. 
Hogg, Canada: The Constitution and Same-Sex Marriage, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 712 (2006). 
 104. E.g., Pierre de Vos, The ‘Inevitability’ of Same-Sex Marriage in South Africa’s 
Post-Apartheid State, 23 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 432, 453-57 (2007); Lisa Newstrom, Note, 
The Horizon of Rights: Lessons from South Africa for the Post-Goodridge Analysis of Same-
Sex Marriage, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 781 (2007). 
 105. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 at paras. 135, 158. 
 106. Id. at para. 156. 
 107. Id. at paras. 157-62. 
 108. Id. at paras. 163-73 (O’Regan, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at para. 138. 
 110. Id. at para. 137. 
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not most, South Africans still considered homosexuality a taboo.112  
With this backdrop, the majority opinion sought to legalize same-sex 
marriage in a way that would minimize backlash.113 
 To be sure, the court acknowledged that the legislature might fail 
to pass legislative reform during the grace period.114  If that were to 
happen, same-sex marriage would not bear the enlarged institutional 
imprimatur that the court sought.  It seems that Justice Sachs and the 
other justices who joined him were willing to take the gamble.  
Perhaps this is because they figured that the backlash to a judicial 
reading-in of same-sex marriage would provoke similar backlash 
regardless of whether it were done right away or in a year.  In this 
view, there was little to lose by waiting a year to see if Parliament 
would lend its support. 
 The court anchored the grace period to section 172 of the 
Constitution, which explicitly allows courts to “suspend declarations 
of invalidity,” granting the legislature time to cure constitutional 
defects.115  In the past, however, the court suspended its decisions 
when it found that new government policies needed to be developed 
to comply with the Constitution, but it was hesitant to decide among 
various constitutionally sound ways of crafting such policies.  For 
example, in Dawood v. Minister of Home Affairs, the court held that 
certain provisions of immigration policy were unconstitutional 
because they failed to explain clearly how immigration officers 
should determine the privileges of noncitizen family members of 
South African citizens.116  Instead of pronouncing new immigration 
rules to remedy this vagueness, the court granted Parliament a two-
year deadline to do so.117  There was “a range of possibilities” that 
                                                 
 112. See id. at para. 138 (“This is a matter that touches on deep public and private 
sensibilities.”); id. at para. 153 (noting patterns of discrimination and homophobia). 
 113. See THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICS OF PRINCIPLE: THE FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 1995-2005 256 (2013) (“The genius of Justice Sachs’s solution lies 
in the way it balances the Court’s duty to enforce the constitutional value system against the 
danger of political backlash.”). 
 114. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 at para. 157. 
 115. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 8, § 172 (“When deciding a constitutional matter 
within its power, a court . . . may make any order that is just and equitable, including . . . an 
order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to allow 
the competent authority to correct the defect.”). 
 116. 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) at para. 61 (S. Afr.). 
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Parliament could pursue to render immigration law clearer and, 
therefore, constitutionally sound.118 
 In contrast, Fourie left Parliament with little room for creative 
policymaking.119  Justice Sachs highlighted two possible ways that 
Parliament could choose to legalize same-sex marriage.  Parliament 
could amend the Marriage Act, or it could create a separate piece of 
legislation to allow same-sex couples to wed.120  Either way, same-sex 
marriage would become a legal reality.121  Despite this fact, the court 
opted for a grace period instead of implementing same-sex marriage 
immediately.122  The court’s main reason for the grace period seemed 
to be its hope that the grace period could defuse controversy and 
mitigate backlash by enlisting the support of Parliament.123 
 Ultimately, in December 2006, Parliament passed a bill to 
legalize same-sex marriage, and the President’s office signed it into 
law.124  South Africa became the fifth country in the world, and the 
first in Africa, to legalize same-sex marriage.125  Parliament chose to 
leave the original Marriage Act intact and passed a parallel piece of 
                                                 
 118. Id. at paras. 63-64. 
 119. See de Vos, supra note 104. 
 120. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at paras. 139-47 (S. 
Afr.). 
 121. The court stated that “the present exclusion of same-sex couples from enjoying 
the status and entitlements coupled with the responsibilities that are accorded to heterosexual 
couples by the common law and the Marriage Act, is constitutionally unsustainable.”  Id. at 
para. 147.  The court did not say explicitly that Parliament needed to extend the label 
“marriage” to same-sex couples.  However, it did declare that same-sex couples are entitled 
to the “status” that marriage affords, and it emphatically rejected the idea of separate but 
equal.  Id. at paras. 147, 150.  As such, one would be extremely hard-pressed to argue that 
Fourie required anything less than the legalization of same-sex marriage.  Justice Sachs has 
since reiterated that the Fourie decision required same-sex marriage and did not permit the 
relegation of same-sex couples to a separate but equal relationship status.  See Albie Sachs, 
Opinion, South Africa’s Path to Marriage Equality, L.A. TIMES (June 13, 2013), http:// 
articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/13/opinion/la-oe-sachs-gay-marriage-south-africa-20130613. 
 Advocates who campaigned for marriage equality wished that Fourie had been more 
explicit about extending the label “marriage” to same-sex couples.  As David Bilchitz 
explained, the Fourie opinion “left some room for political wrangling” even though, 
logically, denying the label “marriage” would not satisfy the court’s requirement of equal 
status.  Interview with David Bilchitz, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 22, 2015).  Parliament’s 
first draft of the Civil Union Bill would have established a “so-called ‘separate but equal’” 
system, and Parliament ultimately rejected it.  de Vos, supra note 104, at 458-61. 
 122. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 
123. 
 123. See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text. 
 124. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.). 
 125. See Hogg, supra note 103, at 712 (discussing the earlier legalization of same-sex 
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legislation called the Civil Union Act.126  The Civil Union Act gives 
same-sex couples and different-sex couples the option to get married, 
as well as the option of entering a “civil partnership” instead.127  Note 
that the South African meaning of “civil union” differs from the 
meaning in the United States, where civil unions and marriages are 
separate institutions.128  In contrast, South Africa’s Civil Union Act 
makes marriages a subcategory of civil unions.129 
 By promulgating the Civil Union Act without repealing the 
Marriage Act, Parliament created a great deal of redundancy.130  
However, whereas the Marriage Act does not allow civil marriage 
officials to opt out of performing different-sex marriages, the Civil 
Union Act permits civil marriage officers to opt out of performing 
same-sex marriages and same-sex civil partnerships based on their 
conscience.131  This opt-out provision, coupled with the symbolism of 
preserving the exclusionary Marriage Act, perpetuates an inequality 
based on sexual orientation.132  Practically speaking, however, same-
sex marriage became legal in 2006, and human rights advocates have 
not challenged the opt-out provision in court, choosing to set their 
sights on more pressing goals instead.133 
 Although it is clear that same-sex marriage is now legal, the 
yearlong legalization process after Fourie prompts many questions.  
What happened during the grace period?  Did the grace period 
enhance the perceived legitimacy of the court and same-sex marriage?  
Or did the grace period simply delay justice without altering the 
public’s perceptions of the court and same-sex marriage?  Since the 
                                                 
 126. For a primer on the Civil Union Act, see David Bilchitz, A Short Guide to the 
Civil Union Act, in TO HAVE AND TO HOLD: THE MAKING OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA, supra note 23, at 202. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Courtney Megan Cahill, (Still) Not Fit to Be Named: Moving Beyond Race 
To Explain Why ‘Separate’ Nomenclature for Gay and Straight Relationships Will Never Be 
‘Equal,’ 97 GEO. L.J. 1155, 1156-71 (2009) (providing background on civil unions in the 
United States). 
 129. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 1 (S. Afr.). 
 130. For example, the Marriage Act and the Civil Union Act both grant different-sex 
couples the ability to marry legally.  See Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 8 (S. Afr.); Marriage 
Act 25 of 1961 § 30 (S. Afr.). 
 131. See Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 6 (S. Afr.). 
 132. For an elaboration on compromise embodied by the Civil Union Act, see David 
Bilchitz with Melanie Judge, The Civil Union Act: Messy Compromise or Giant Leap 
Forward?, in TO HAVE AND TO HOLD: THE MAKING OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA, supra note 23, at 149. 
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Constitutional Court directed Parliament’s actions, did the public view 
the court as activist and ultimately responsible for same-sex marriage?  
I explore these questions in the following subparts.  Using data from 
newspaper articles and interviews I conducted with South African 
human rights activists, I seek to deepen our understanding of how the 
grace period unfolded. 
B. Method of Investigation 
 My research strives to develop an understanding of how, if at all, 
the grace period influenced perceptions of the Constitutional Court 
and same-sex marriage.134  To investigate this question, I first turned to 
newspaper articles.  Reports and editorials in newspapers provide a 
window into public sentiments.  To be sure, newspapers present a 
filtered representation of public views because their staffs decide what 
to publish and what not to publish.  Even as an imperfect reflection of 
public sentiments, however, newspaper content sheds light on the 
grace period after Fourie.  In addition to reflecting public opinion, 
newspaper content is also illuminating because of its role in shaping 
public views.  Newspapers develop narratives about current events, 
and such narratives powerfully impact public perceptions.135 
 It is worth noting that my research did not evaluate public 
opinion polling data, which would have provided a more direct 
measure of public sentiments.  Jacobi’s study on the grace period 
following Massachusetts’s same-sex marriage decision suggests that 
public opinion data could be insightful.  Unfortunately, relevant 
polling data is not available for the grace period following Fourie. 
 My content analysis of newspapers is based on a set of 215 
articles published during the grace period.136  I collected these articles 
from nine English-language newspapers in South Africa.  Five were 
daily newspapers: Business Day, Cape Argus, Citizen, Daily Sun, and 
Sowetan.  Four were weekly publications: City Press, Sunday Sun, 
                                                 
 134. In this inquiry, I defined “influence” broadly to include ways that the grace 
period might have indirectly affected public perceptions.  I was interested in whether 
prolonging the timeline for realizing same-sex marriage enabled any social or political 
developments that altered public perceptions. 
 135. MAXWELL MCCOMBS, SETTING THE AGENDA: THE MASS MEDIA AND PUBLIC 
OPINION (2004) (explaining how mass media shapes public opinion through “agenda-
setting”). 
 136. I counted each letter to the editor as one article.  Compendia of quotes published 
under a headline, such as a voces populi, were counted as an article.  Each editorial cartoon 
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Sunday Times, and Sunday World.  I chose these newspapers because 
of their relatively high circulation rates.137  With differing reputations 
in terms of their readerships’ social and political backgrounds, the 
dataset’s newspapers reach a considerable cross section of the South 
African population.138  Details about these newspapers’ circulation and 
readership can be found in Appendix 1. 
 Of these newspapers, only Business Day’s articles from the grace 
period have been completely digitized.139  I retrieved articles from the 
remaining newspapers in either hard copy or microfilm format.  
Because the nondigitized sources were not searchable by keyword, I 
scoured each newspaper for relevant articles published within four 
windows during the grace period.  Each window corresponded with 
an event triggering media coverage: (1) the issuance of the Fourie 
decision, (2) the Cabinet’s preapproval of relevant legislation, (3) the 
introduction of legislation in Parliament, and (4) the final weeks of the 
grace period, during which Parliament passed the Civil Union Act and 
the acting President signed it into law.  I considered an article to be 
relevant if it referred to law reform prompted by Fourie.140  Appendix 
                                                 
 137. Circulation data came from the Audit Bureau of Circulations of South Africa.  
Cape Argus, The Citizen, Daily Sun, and Sowetan were four of the five English-language 
dailies with highest circulation.  I did not include the fifth newspaper from that category, The 
Star, because it is a tabloid that is not archived at the National Library of South Africa, where 
I conducted most of my research.  City Press, Sunday Sun, Sunday Times, and Sunday 
World were four of the five English-language weeklies with highest circulation.  I did not 
include the fifth newspaper from this category, Soccer Laduma, because of its focus on 
soccer news.  In addition to selecting these eight newspapers, I included Business Day 
because of easy access and the fact that it ranked highly in circulation, even though it was not 
one of the top five dailies (it ranked eighth).  Business Day was easily accessible and 
searchable in digital format.  The other newspapers were available only in hard copy or on 
microfilm. 
 138. My dataset did not include newspapers published in languages other than 
English, such as Afrikaans or isiZulu.  It is important to note that this omission might obscure 
differences among demographic groups in South Africa.  English, however, is the lingua 
franca of South African media, education, politics, and business.  As such, English-language 
publications reach a broad range of readers.  See Neville Alexander, Language Politics in 
South Africa, in 2 SHIFTING AFRICAN IDENTITIES 141, 146-47 (Simon Bekker et al. eds., 
2001) (describing English’s lingua franca status in South Africa). 
 139. A small number of articles from the other newspapers had been selectively 
digitized by Sabinet, a library services company.  Sabinet’s database includes only a small 
number of articles from the grace period. 
 140. The dataset includes articles that explicitly discussed the legalization of same-sex 
marriage or civil partnerships in South Africa.  The dataset also includes articles that 
implicitly referred to same-sex marriage or civil partnerships in South Africa.  For example, I 
would include an article if it discussed law reform regarding gay relationships without using 
the terms “marriage” or “civil partnership,” and the article was published immediately after 
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2 provides dates for each search period and the number of articles 
identified for each period.141 
 Using NVivo qualitative research software, I coded the 215 
articles to explore how the articles described events and opinions.142  
For example, when Parliament passed the bill to legalize same-sex 
marriage, I examined the language that newspapers used to report that 
event.  The report could describe the event as Parliament exercising its 
own agency to make same-sex marriage a legal right, or alternatively, 
it could describe Parliament as simply following the Constitutional 
Court’s directive.  The manner in which the event is described can 
impact public perceptions of the court vis-à-vis Parliament.  Likewise, 
when examining opinion pieces, I examined how praise and criticism 
were formulated and whether such sentiments were directed at the 
court, other branches of government, or both.  Appendix 3 provides an 
outline of my coding scheme. 
 The second component of my case study was interviews with 
seven LGBTI143 rights advocates in South Africa.144  The advocates I 
interviewed shared their thoughts on how they sought to shape public 
opinion during the grace period.  They also discussed how they 
believe the grace period ultimately affected public perceptions.  A list 
of my interview subjects can be found in Appendix 4. 
                                                                                                             
 The dataset does not include articles that focus on same-sex marriage outside of South 
Africa.  For example, several articles from the grace period reported the same-sex wedding of 
British celebrity Elton John without delving into the topic of law reform in South Africa.  
Those articles were excluded.  The dataset also excludes articles reporting solely on the 
Constitutional Court case of Gory v. Kolver NO, which concerned the inheritance rights of 
unmarried same-sex partners.  See Gory v. Kolver NO 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 141. A full list of the 215 articles in the dataset is available via SSRN.  Holning Lau, 
Comparative Perspectives on Strategic Remedial Delay: Newspaper Source List, SSRN 
(May 25, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2784262 [hereinafter Lau, Newspaper Source List]. 
 142. To strengthen the reliability of my coding, I had a research assistant 
independently code the main subsets of data that I determined to be most relevant to the 
discussions in subpart III.C.  I made minor adjustments to my coding based on this cross-
check.  I also controlled the quality of my newspaper analysis by corroborating key findings 
through interviews with LGBTI rights activists in South Africa.  (The acronym “LGBTI” is 
commonly used in South Africa and elsewhere as a shorthand for “lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, and intersex.”)  For a list of interview subjects, see infra Appendix 4. 
 143. For an explanation of the acronym “LGBTI,” see supra note 142. 
 144. I received Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from the University of 
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C. Unfolding the Story of the Grace Period 
 A close look at my newspaper and interview data revealed four 
overlapping themes that ultimately enhanced the perceived legitimacy 
both of the Constitutional Court and of same-sex marriage.145  Note 
that these two areas of legitimacy are not inherently linked.  For 
example, people might believe that same-sex marriage is a socially 
legitimate institution, yet believe that the judiciary legalized same-sex 
marriage through illegitimate means.  The four themes in the data 
suggest, however, that the grace period enhanced the perceived 
legitimacy of both the court and same-sex marriage.  This subpart 
explores each of these themes. 
1. Altering Perception of Options 
 The Fourie opinion contemplated a very narrow path for 
Parliament.146  The court directed Parliament to legalize same-sex 
marriage, and if Parliament refused to do so within a year, the court 
would legalize same-sex marriage by judicial decree.147  In light of this 
demand, it was reasonable to believe that public accusations of 
judicial activism would not wane much during the grace period.  
Based on the Fourie opinion alone, the public would likely perceive 
Parliament as a passive partner in the legalization process, assigning 
primary responsibility to the court. 
 Beyond the pages of the Fourie opinion, however, the media 
constructed a different view of Parliamentary action.  The media 
portrayed Parliament’s legalization of same-sex marriage as an 
assertive act of volition, not merely passive following of the 
Constitutional Court’s directive.  Based on this understanding of 
Parliamentary agency, same-sex marriage opponents’ complaints of 
                                                 
 145. It is worth emphasizing that my research examines extrinsic perceptions of 
legitimacy among the public, as opposed to intrinsic measures of legitimacy such as the 
strength of a legal decision’s logic and fidelity to precedent.  In other words, my study 
focuses on what Richard Fallon has described as “sociological legitimacy,” as opposed to 
“legal legitimacy.”  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1787, 1794-96 (2005).  “When legitimacy is measured in sociological terms, a 
constitutional regime, governmental institution, or official decision possesses legitimacy in a 
strong sense insofar as the relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise 
deserving of support for reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward.”  
Id. at 1795 (emphasis omitted). 
 146. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text. 
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judicial overreach eventually diminished, and criticism was redirected 
at Parliament. 
 Newspapers emphasized Parliament’s volition by expanding the 
scope of Parliament’s options beyond Fourie’s contemplation and by 
focusing attention on Parliament’s agency in decision-making.  
Consider first the media’s role in constructing the scope of 
Parliament’s options.  In Fourie’s wake, the most vociferous opponents 
of same-sex marriage drew attention to a path that Fourie did not 
explicitly contemplate.  These activists pressed Parliament to pass a 
constitutional amendment to override Fourie and enshrine the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.  Four of the five major 
dailies—Business Day, Cape Argus, Citizen, and Sowetan—presented 
the idea of constitutional amendment, and the idea had a recurring 
presence in three of these newspapers.148 
                                                 
 148. See Mike Atkins, Letter to the Editor, Marriage Exists Between a Man and a 
Woman, CAPE ARGUS (S. Afr.), Dec. 5, 2005, at 11 [hereinafter Atkins, Marriage Exists]; 
Mike Atkins, Editorial, Not Fitting Bill, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.) (Nov. 28, 2006), http://infoweb. 
newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/132D6E9F514AF4C8?p=AWNB [hereinafter Atkins, 
Not Fitting Bill]; Andrew Bateman, Letter to the Editor, Tomorrow’s Children Would Tell 
Us the Truth, CAPE ARGUS (S. Afr.), Nov. 16, 2006, at 18; Wyndham Hartley, All Same-Sex 
Law Needs Is President’s Signature, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.) (Nov. 29, 2006), http://infoweb. 
newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/132D6E905E3C6310?p=AWNB [hereinafter Hartley, 
All Same-Sex Law Needs]; Wyndham Hartley, MPs Dig in Heels Against Same-Sex Unions, 
BUS. DAY (S. Afr.) (Sept. 14, 2006), http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/ 
132D6E789067C4A0?p=AWNB; Wyndham Hartley, Editorial, Uneasy Marriage Between 
Creed and Constitution, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.) (Nov. 29, 2006), http://infoweb.newsbank. 
com/resources/doc/nb/news/132D6E906E263580?p=AWNB [hereinafter Hartley, Uneasy 
Marriage]; Norman Joseph, Mass Christian Protests Against Same-Sex Union Bill Planned, 
CAPE ARGUS (S. Afr.), Sept. 12, 2006, at 6; Melanie Judge, Editorial, Social Amnesia, BUS. 
DAY (S. Afr.) (Sept. 18, 2006), http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/ 
132D6EA3DA1B6538?p=AWNB; Ernest Mabuza, Constitutional Court Orders Law to 
Bless Same-Sex Ties, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.) (Dec. 2, 2005), http://infoweb.newsbank.com/ 
resources/doc/nb/news/132D7065D8964020?p=AWNB; Sipokazi Maposa, Mixed Reaction 
to Same-Sex Ruling, CAPE ARGUS (S. Afr.), Dec. 2, 2005, at 2 [hereinafter Maposa, Mixed 
Reaction]; Sipokazi Maposa, Same-Sex Union Bill Slated for Lack of Consultation, CAPE 
ARGUS (S. Afr.), Sept. 14, 2006, at 6 [hereinafter Maposa, Same-Sex Union Bill]; Waghled 
Misbach & South African Press Association (SAPA), Parties Split on Gay Marriages, 
SOWETAN (S. Afr.), Dec. 2, 2005, at 4; Kennedy Mudzuli, Same-Sex Bill ‘Not Needed,’ 
CITIZEN (S. Afr.), Nov. 16, 2006, at 6; Angela Quintal, Bill Recognises Partnerships, CAPE 
ARGUS (S. Afr.), Aug. 25, 2006, at 10; Philip Rosenthal, Letter to the Editor, Civil Union Bill 
Is an Insult to Marriage, CITIZEN (S. Afr.), Nov. 30, 2006, at 13; Bob van der Berg, Letter to 
the Editor, ‘Marriage’ of Gays Not God’s Purpose, CITIZEN (S. Afr.), Dec. 8, 2005, at 13; 
Mzolisi Witbooi, Ndungane Sees Red over Same-Sex Marriages, CAPE ARGUS (S. Afr.), 
Sept. 15, 2006, at 5; see also Waghied Misbach, Last-Gasp Bid to Stop Signing of Gay Bill, 
SOWETAN (S. Afr.) (Nov. 24, 2006), http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/sowetan/archive/2006/ 
11/24/last-gasp-bid-to-stop-signing-of-gay-bill (noting the proposal of a national referendum 
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 Although the amendment was tabled in the National Assembly’s 
Portfolio Committee, it never made it out of the committee.149  None 
of the human rights activists whom I interviewed perceived the 
proposed amendment as a real threat.150  Most South Africans and the 
ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), had such pride in 
the relatively new constitution that they were reluctant to tinker with 
it.151  The proposed amendment was never likely to garner the requisite 
two-thirds support in the National Assembly.152 
 Yet, newspapers presented a different story, portraying the 
constitutional amendment as a real possibility.  Newspapers spoke of 
wide support for the constitutional amendment.  For example, pieces 
in Business Day stated that the amendment “was proposed by a broad 
range of individuals and organisations,”153 “a large number of people 
have argued that the constitution should be changed,”154 and “many of 
the submissions to Parliament . . . called for the constitution to be 
changed.”155  Likewise, Cape Argus ran pieces stating that “[m]ass 
Christian demonstrations”156 were planned to support the amendment 
and that the amendment was “quite possible.”157  A piece in The 
Citizen echoed this sentiment: “It is so easy for the government with 
their two-thirds majority to change the constitution.”158 
                                                                                                             
 The proposed constitutional amendment did not appear in articles from the dataset’s 
weeklies.  This omission may be a result of methodological limitations.  I only reviewed 
articles published during certain windows of time within the grace period, but articles 
discussing the constitutional amendment could have been published outside of those 
windows.  It is also possible that these newspapers chose not to cover the proposed 
constitutional amendment because they considered the amendment’s passage unlikely. 
 149. Civil Union Bill, Films & Publications and Immigration Amendment Bills: 
Briefing by Minister of Home Affairs, PARLIAMENTARY MONITORING GROUP (Sept. 6, 2006), 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7285/ (committee meeting minutes). 
 150. See infra Appendix 4 (listing interview subjects). 
 151. See Interview with Anonymous, in S. Afr. (Aug. 5, 2014) (notes on file with 
author) (“At that point in history, the new constitution was very powerful in public discourse.  
Going against the constitution implied a slippery slope of all types of rights being taken 
away.”); Interview with David Bilchitz, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 22, 2015) (“I don’t 
think constitutional amendment was ever on the cards.  There was really a fear about 
tampering with the Constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights.”). 
 152. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 4, § 74 (describing the requirements for amending 
the Constitution).  
 153. Atkins, Not Fitting Bill, supra note 148. 
 154. Hartley, Uneasy Marriage, supra note 148. 
 155. Hartley, All Same-Sex Law Needs, supra note 148. 
 156. Maposa, Same-Sex Union Bill, supra note 148. 
 157. Atkins, Marriage Exists, supra note 148. 
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 None of the newspapers’ discussions about the proposed 
amendment considered the difficulty of securing two-thirds approval 
in the National Assembly.159  The media’s framing of the amendment 
as a real possibility contributed to the public’s perception of 
Parliament’s power.160  Under this perception, Parliament was free to 
override Fourie, and the most ardent opponents of same-sex marriage 
expected Parliament to do so. 
 Providing an alternative to constitutional amendment, opponents 
of same-sex marriage also championed a bill that would have defined 
civil unions differently than in the version of the Civil Union Bill that 
Parliament ultimately passed.161  This first version of the Civil Union 
Bill would have preserved marriage exclusively for different-sex 
couples, while same-sex couples could enter a separate institution 
called “civil unions.”162  Parliament jettisoned this framework because 
it was pretty clear that it did not satisfy Fourie.163  Nonetheless, 
opponents of same-sex marriage preferred the original bill’s 
framework.  They urged Parliament to adopt the first bill, which 
would have been a symbolic rebuke of the Constitutional Court.164  
Further litigation would have been necessary to invalidate the original 
bill’s framework and replace it with marriage equality.165 
 While conservative activists and the media expanded the scope 
of Parliament’s options, newspapers also emphasized Parliament’s 
                                                 
 159. See sources cited supra note 148. 
 160. Cf. MCCOMBS, supra note 135 (explaining how mass media shapes public 
opinion through “agenda-setting”). 
 161. For background on this initial version of the Civil Union Bill, see de Vos, supra 
note 104, at 458-61.  As discussed above, the final version of the Civil Union Bill legalized 
same-sex marriage and uses the term “civil union” as an umbrella term that includes same-
sex marriage.  See supra notes 124-129 and accompanying text. 
 162. See de Vos, supra note 104. 
 163. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text. 
 164. Even after the National Assembly approved the version of the Civil Union Act 
that extends the “marriage” label to same-sex couples, some advocates urged Parliament’s 
lower house, the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), to withhold the “marriage” label 
and grant legal recognition to same-sex couples using a different term.  See, e.g., Same-Sex 
Marriage Bill Needs to Be Finalised, DAILY SUN (S. Afr.), Nov. 23, 2006, at 36 (quoting a 
spokesman from the African Christian Democratic Party); see also Rosenthal, supra note 148 
(lamenting that the NCOP approved the version of the Civil Union Bill that legalized same-
sex marriage, as opposed to the earlier version of the bill). 
 165. The first version of the Civil Union Bill posed a much more realistic threat than 
the proposed constitutional amendment.  Several of the activists I interviewed feared that the 
first version of the Bill would pass and need to be litigated for violating Fourie.  Interview 
with Jonathan Berger, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 21, 2015); Interview with David 
Bilchitz, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 22, 2015); Videoconference Interview with Fikile 
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agency in choosing among the options.  Toward the end of the grace 
period, newspapers often focused on Parliament’s actions without 
reminding readers that Parliament was following orders.  Some pieces 
went further by using language that connotes agency and volition on 
Parliament’s part.  After both houses of Parliament voted to legalize 
same-sex marriage, one op-ed put it particularly bluntly: “[I]t must 
never be said that Parliament did not have a choice in this.”166 
  Consider the final period of this Article’s dataset.  Within that 
time, fifty-four articles mentioned Parliament’s deliberations on, or 
passage of, the Civil Union Bill.167  Among those articles, only twelve 
pieces stated that the court directed Parliament to change existing law 
or otherwise ascribed responsibility to the court for legalizing same-
sex marriage.168  An additional seventeen articles were more opaque, 
mentioning that the court had prompted parliamentary deliberations 
without acknowledging that the court expected the deliberations to 
result in the legalization of same-sex marriage.169  Forty-six percent of 
the articles—twenty-five of fifty-four—did not mention at all that 
Parliament was acting under a judicial directive.170 
 Close examination of the articles from the end of the grace 
period suggests that the shift in focus away from the court is tied to 
authors’ fixation on parliamentary agency.171  Numerous articles used 
language that emphasized Parliament’s decision-making capacity.172  
Consider the way that newspapers covered the fact that the ANC 
leadership decided to require its Members of Parliament (MPs) to 
vote for the Civil Union Act, while other parties either voted as a 
                                                 
 166. Atkins, Not Fitting Bill, supra note 148. 
 167. See Lau, Newspaper Source List, supra note 141, at annots. 1-3. 
 168. See id. at annot. 1. 
 169. See id. at annot. 2. 
 170. See id. at annot. 3. 
 171. At first, one might hypothesize that newspaper articles shifted their focus away 
from the court because they assumed readers already knew that the court directed legislative 
action and, therefore, that fact need not be stated explicitly.  A closer look at the articles, 
however, suggests that the focal shift stemmed at least partly from authors’ beliefs that Fourie 
did not greatly constrain the political branches of government.  See supra note 170 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 172-174 and accompanying text. 
 172. See, e.g., Linda Daniels, Same-Sex Marriage Bill Will Be Signed into Law by 
Constitutional Court Deadline, CAPE ARGUS (S. Afr.), Nov. 29, 2006, at 3; Wyndham 
Hartley, ANC Forces Gay Union Bill over Next Hurdle, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.), Nov. 28, 2006, 
at 3; Wyndham Hartley, Civil Union Bill Deadline Draws Nearer, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.), Nov. 
22, 2006, at 3; Waghied Misbach, Marriage Bill Deadline Looms for ANC, SOWETAN (S. 
Afr.), Nov. 15, 2006, at 4; Jon Qwelane, Editorial, No Conscience as ANC Vote for “Stabani 
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block against the bill or were divided on the issue.173  Some articles 
described the ANC as using its legislative majority to “force,” “push,” 
or “steamroller” the Civil Union Act through Parliament, against the 
resistance of MPs from other political parties who voted against the 
bill.174  Language such as “force,” “push,” and “steamroller” paint the 
picture of an assertive ANC, as opposed to an ANC that was passively 
following the court’s directions.  Meanwhile, by emphasizing that 
MPs outside the ANC voted against the bill, newspapers created a foil 
highlighting the ANC’s agency; readers were reminded that the ANC 
could have rebuked the Constitutional Court by voting against the 
legalization of same-sex marriage.  This rebuke would have had little 
practical consequence because, pursuant to Fourie, the court would 
have legalized same-sex marriage by judicial decree anyway.175  Yet, as 
discussed below, opponents of same-sex marriage ascribed great 
significance to Parliament’s decision not to symbolically reject the 
Constitutional Court’s support of same-sex marriage. 
 To be clear, the newspapers could have developed a very 
different narrative.  Instead of highlighting Parliament’s agency, 
newspapers could have emphasized that Parliament was following the 
Constitutional Court’s order, underscoring the role of the court in 
legalizing same-sex marriage.176  A variety of factors could have 
animated the decision to present Parliament’s actions as volitional.  
For example, it is possible that stories about controversial 
parliamentary decisions boost readership or that reporters’ preexisting 
views of Parliament biased their reporting style.177  However, these are 
just speculations.  The data cannot explain newspapers’ motives for 
                                                 
 173. The ANC leadership steered the party’s MPs through a procedure known as the 
“three-line whip.”  See ‘Now We Have Reached Consenus’: Interview with Andries Nel, in 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD: THE MAKING OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 
23, at 109-110 (discussing the three-line whip in relation to the Civil Union Act in an 
interview with the Deputy Chief Whip of the ANC). 
 174. See sources cited supra note 172. 
 175. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text. 
 176. A few newspaper articles did take this approach.  See, e.g., Editorial, State of the 
Union, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.), Nov. 14, 2006, at 18 (“Parliament was between a rock and a hard 
place: it had no choice but to legalise gay marriage by the end of this month but was also 
under immense pressure from its conservative constituencies to acknowledge the traditional 
form of the institution.”). 
 177. Activists against same-sex marriage may have sought to exaggerate the viability 
of a constitutional amendment, and this may have been reflected in some editorialists’ 
writings.  The question remains, however, why the newspapers chose not to balance those 
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drawing attention to Parliament’s decision-making agency.  For the 
purposes of this Article, my focus is on describing what narrative the 
newspapers developed, while leaving the question why to another day. 
 In sum, the Fourie Court limited Parliament’s power by ordering 
it to legalize same-sex marriage.  Yet, the media presented a different 
understanding of Parliamentary power.  In this light, Parliament had a 
broad range of options from which to choose with a great degree of 
volition.  Parliament became an active participant in legalizing same-
sex marriage, as opposed to being the passive partner of an assertive 
court.  As discussed in the next subpart, this perception of Parliament 
helped to redirect criticism away from the court and enhance the 
legitimacy of same-sex marriage. 
2. Shifting the Target Away from the Court 
 The growing emphasis on parliamentary agency during the grace 
period corresponded with shifts in people’s opinions about the 
government.  This is evident in newspapers’ opinion pieces 
concerning the government’s role in legalizing same-sex marriage.  
The opinion pieces in my dataset illuminate interesting patterns in 
which criticism and praise of the Constitutional Court shifted as 
Parliament became involved in the legalization of same-sex marriage. 
 First, consider the diffusion of criticism.  In Fourie’s immediate 
wake, opinion pieces that opposed same-sex marriage targeted their 
criticism at the Constitutional Court.  Ten opinion pieces criticized 
either the Constitutional Court or the Fourie decision specifically.178  
Three pieces chastised the “government” for supporting same-sex 
marriage, apparently using “government” as a synecdoche for the 
Constitutional Court.179  One piece targeted the ANC, critically 
foreshadowing the ANC’s compliance with Fourie.180 
 The newspapers published virtually no opinion pieces during the 
second and third periods of study.  By the fourth period, however, 
opinion pieces proliferated and the target shifted.  Opponents of same-
sex marriage redirected their criticism at the political branches of 
government, at the ANC, and at the government generally.  In the 
fourth period, only two articles criticized the court for its role in 
legalizing same-sex marriage; meanwhile, twenty articles couched 
                                                 
 178. See Lau, Newspaper Source List, supra note 141, at annot. 4. 
 179. See id. at annot. 5. 
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their criticism in broad references to the South African government, 
and twenty-five articles criticized the ANC or the political branches of 
government.181 
 Beyond this numerical breakdown of the articles, I observed 
changes through a qualitative assessment of the articles’ arguments.  
Initial criticism of the court came in roughly two categories.  Most 
criticism chastised the court for being immoral and for dishonoring 
tradition.182  The second strand of criticism derided the court for being 
undemocratic and counter-majoritarian.  For example, commentators 
stated: “[T]hese judges are not elected by the people of South Africa 
and they have now made a decision that definitely goes against the 
grain of South African society. . . .  The court has given the God-given 
rights of heterosexuals away to a minority.”183  “Now that the 
Constitutional Court has made its ruling on gay marriages it is with 
great sadness that the majority of people of this once beautiful 
country have to live with such an immoral law.”184  “[T]he highest 
court in the land has seen fit to ignore the warnings of the majority of 
South Africans.”185 
 Over time, however, criticism of the legalization of same-sex 
marriage transformed as the court passed the baton to the political 
branches.  As noted earlier, many of the opinion pieces from the end 
of the grace period framed their criticism around the state generally.186  
Meanwhile, other pieces specifically targeted the political branches of 
government and the ANC.  Critics argued that elected officials 
“abused [their] mandate” by failing to validate their constituencies’ 
                                                 
 181. These categories were not mutually exclusive.  See id. at annots. 7 (criticizing the 
Constitutional Court), 8 (criticizing government generally), 9 (criticizing the ANC or political 
branches of government).  I included criticisms of South Africa’s democratic form of 
governance in the second category of criticism (i.e., criticism of government generally). 
 182. See, e.g., Mongameli Motabane, Letter to the Editor, Marry God’s Way, DAILY 
SUN (S. Afr.), Dec. 7, 2005, at 35 (criticizing Fourie for violating religious principles); 
Opinion, ‘No Law or Church Invented Marriage,’ SUNDAY TIMES (S. Afr.), Dec. 4, 2005 
(quoting Isak Burger, head of the Apostolic Faith Mission); Opinion, SMS the Argus, CAPE 
ARGUS (S. Afr.), Dec. 5, 2005, at 10 (vox populi featuring numerous criticisms based on 
religion and morality). 
 183. Dicks, supra note 22. 
 184. Thomas, supra note 22. 
 185. See Maposa, Mixed Reaction, supra note 148 (quoting news reports with Errol 
Naidoo, spokesperson for His People Christian Church). 
 186. See supra note 181 and accompanying text; see also Thandeka Khoza, Letter to 
the Editor, Gays Invite God’s Wrath, SUNDAY WORLD (S. Afr.), Dec. 10, 2006, at 16 (“As for 
government, you bunch of cowards should be ashamed of yourselves.”); Ntate Mojela, Letter 
to the Editor, Always Wrong!, DAILY SUN (S. Afr.), Nov. 27, 2006, at 47 (“Everything that 
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rejection of same-sex marriage.187  Critics complained that the Civil 
Union Act was a “trashing of democracy,”188 “a slap in the face for 
democracy and the so-called will of the people,”189 and evidence that 
South Africa “is no more a democracy than Zimbabwe.”190  Critics 
complained further: “It is clear that the ruling part [sic] does not 
represent the views of the majority, but are only interested in our 
votes. . . .  I will not vote for the ANC again because they are all 
irresponsible.”191  “We voted for you, and now you are oppressing us 
more than the Bothas of the past.”192  “President Mbeki and his cabinet 
must learn to consult the people.”193 
 These critiques generally failed to acknowledge that the court 
provoked the political branches’ participation in the legalization of 
same-sex marriage.194  In fact, consistent with our earlier discussion,195 
some opinion pieces used language to suggest that the ANC wielded a 
great degree of decision-making agency—acting “as it pleased,” 
“pushing [its] own . . .  agenda,” and “steamrollering” the Civil Union 
Bill over opposition.196  In such articles, same-sex marriage opponents 
                                                 
 187. See Abraham T. Sibiya, Editorial, Same-Sex Marriage Is Last Straw To Break 
Our Back, SUNDAY SUN (S. Afr.), Nov. 19, 2006, at 30. 
 188. Philip Rosenthal, Letter to the Editor, Civil Union Bill Is a Trashing of Our 
Democracy, CAPE ARGUS (S. Afr.), Nov. 30, 2006, at 24. 
 189. Opinion, SMS Feedback, CAPE ARGUS (S. Afr.), Nov. 15, 2006, at 18 (“So much 
for democracy when [elected officials] do just as they please.”). 
 190. Judy van Aardt, Editorial, Age of Consent, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.) (Nov. 14, 2006), 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/132D6E9F520C7008?p=AWNB; see 
also Dennis Rasebotja, Letter to the Editor, Same-Sex Couples Are Useless, DAILY SUN (S. 
Afr.), Nov. 20, 2006, at 39 (“Is this the benefits of democracy?”). 
 191. Bongani Nyoni, Letter to the Editor, Same-Sex Law Shocks, DAILY SUN (S. 
Afr.), Dec. 5, 2006, at 39; see also Thabile Mange, Letter to the Editor, Call for Effective 
Opposition, SOWETAN (S. Afr.), Dec. 4, 2006, at 16 (calling for a strengthening of opposition 
parties, so that voters could punish the ANC for supporting same-sex marriage). 
 192. Thandeka Khoza, Letter to the Editor, Our Country Is Losing the Plot, DAILY 
SUN (S. Afr.), Dec. 5, 2006, at 39. 
 193. Gab Mokoena Mthambothini, Letter to the Editor, Gay Marriages Will Ruin Us, 
DAILY SUN (S. Afr.), Nov. 17, 2006, at 47; Mzwebandla Nongaza, Letter to the Editor, Gay 
Union Is Satanic, DAILY SUN (S. Afr.), Nov. 28, 2006, at 35 (“When I voted in [the first post-
Apartheid election in] 1994 there was a slogan which said: ‘The people shall govern’.  But 
today everybody has forgotten that, even the president.”). 
 194. Of the twenty-five opinion pieces from the final observation period that criticized 
the ANC or political branches, only two also criticized the Constitutional Court.  See Lau, 
Newspaper Source List, supra note 141, at annots. 7-8. 
 195. See supra notes 171-174 and accompanying text; cf. Interview with David 
Bilchitz, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 22, 2015) (“The ANC—the majority party—was 
forced to take ownership of [the legalization of same-sex marriage].”). 
 196. See, e.g., Thabile Mange, Letter to the Editor, The ANC Does as It Pleases!, 
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turned their attention away from the Constitutional Court not simply 
because the grace period provided a cooling-off period that tempered 
anger at the court through the mere passage of time; instead, the grace 
period facilitated political developments that contributed to a focal 
shift. 
 Commentary that praised the government for legalizing same-
sex marriage shifted similarly to the commentary that was critical.  
Many opinion pieces supported same-sex marriage and celebrated the 
principle of equality without praising particular government 
institutions.197  In the pieces that did praise the government, however, 
the target of praise shifted from the court to the political branches and 
to the government generally.  In the dataset’s first period, three articles 
praised the Constitutional Court for its decision in Fourie.198  By the 
final period, four articles praised the political branches or the ANC, 
one article praised the South African government generally, and only 
one article specifically complimented the court for pushing the state 
forward on its journey to marriage equality.199 
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that these shifts in criticism and 
praise have endured to the present.  Some of the activists I interviewed 
remarked that the ANC is still attributed responsibility, and therefore 
criticism and praise, for same-sex marriage’s legalization.  For 
example, Jonathan Berger remarked that he recently saw an ANC 
spokesperson credit the ANC for the legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage.200  Likewise, David Bilchitz put it simply: “[T]he ANC took 
ownership of the issue.”201 
                                                                                                             
Sibiya, supra note 187 (accusing the ANC of “steamrolling” and “pushing [its] own immoral 
agenda”); SMS Feedback, supra note 189 (claiming that elected officials “do just as they 
please”). 
 197. See, e.g., Matome Seima, Letter to the Editor, Gays, Lesbians Have Rights, 
SOWETAN (S. Afr.), Nov. 17, 2006, at 28; Brian Venter, Letter to the Editor, Bible-Bashers 
Show Intolerance, CITIZEN (S. Afr.), Dec. 4, 2006, at 13. 
 198. See Lau, Newspaper Source List, supra note 141, at annot. 10.  One of these 
articles agreed with Fourie’s finding of a rights deprivation, but criticized the decision for its 
remedial delay.  See Carmel Rickard, Editorial, At Heart, Ruling Lacks Courage, SUNDAY 
TIMES (S. Afr.), Dec. 4, 2005, at 7. 
 199. These categories were not mutually exclusive.  See Lau, Newspaper Source List, 
supra note 141, at annots. 11 (praising political branches of government), 12 (praising 
government generally), 13 (praising the Constitutional Court). 
 200. Interview with Jonathan Berger, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 21, 2015). 
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3. Fortifying Support for Same-Sex Marriage and Equal 
Citizenship 
 Thus far, we have examined how the grace period influenced 
views of the Constitutional Court vis-à-vis other branches of 
government.  Beyond shaping views of the Constitutional Court’s 
legitimacy, the grace period also influenced perceptions of same-sex 
marriage, as the majority in Fourie had hoped. 
 Supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage seem to agree 
that the grace period ultimately helped to legitimize same-sex 
marriage, though the two sides disagree on whether that is good or 
bad.  The grace period enhanced the legitimacy of same-sex marriage 
in at least two ways.  First, Parliament and the President’s office 
helped to legitimize same-sex marriage by giving their stamps of 
approval through the legislative process.  As the majority in Fourie 
had hoped, the grace period expanded the “government imprimatur” 
on same-sex marriage.  Almost all the human rights advocates I 
interviewed agreed that securing Parliament’s official support for 
same-sex marriage legitimized it.202  As Melanie Judge put it: “The 
Civil Union Act is far from perfect, but what it did do was lend the 
weight of Parliament to the outcome [of same-sex marriage] in a way 
the court on its own would not have done.  I think, from a sociological 
perspective, that had great merit to it.”203  Worries about this 
legitimizing function also animated some of the comments that same-
sex marriage opponents made in newspapers, even though they did 
not expressly use the term “legitimacy.”  These critics were concerned 
that passage of the Civil Union Bill put same-sex marriage on firmer 
ground than the Fourie decision alone did, deepening the so-called 
insult to tradition.204 
                                                 
 202. See infra Appendix 4 (list of interview subjects).  One interview subject, Zethu 
Matebeni, said that while she understands this legitimization argument, she believes that the 
political branches of government did not truly support marriage equality because they chose 
to enact the Civil Union Act instead of simply amending the Marriage Act; as such, she is 
skeptical of whether the actions of Parliament and the President really served any 
legitimizing function.  Telephone Interview (via Skype) with Zethu Matebeni (Aug. 27, 
2015). 
 203. Interview with Melanie Judge, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Aug. 4, 2014). 
 204. See Atkins, Not Fitting Bill, supra note 148 (suggesting that “[a]lthough the 
ruling of the Constitutional Court was explicit,” Parliament and the President made matters 
worse by enacting the Civil Union Act); Rosenthal, supra note 148 (criticizing the 
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 The second way that the grace period enhanced the legitimacy of 
same-sex marriage is by creating a discursive space in which 
advocates humanized the issue of same-sex marriage.  Prior to the 
Fourie decision, marriage equality advocates did not have a strong 
presence in public discourse beyond the courts.  Media coverage of 
gay issues prior to the grace period was relatively scant and often 
insensitive.205 
 The grace period fostered a new visibility.  As part of the 
legislative process for legalizing same-sex marriage, Parliament 
arranged public hearings in each of South Africa’s nine provinces.206  
These venues gave LGBTI advocates a chance to share their stories 
and win over the hearts and minds of fellow South Africans.  The 
grace period also brought LGBTI advocates unprecedented access to 
the media, which fostered a newfound feeling of empowerment.  
Melanie Judge recounted: 
The one-year period definitely opened up a space for visibility and 
vocality of queer folk, without a doubt, and I think people took that 
space.  LGBTI people went to the hearings.  They spoke out.  There was 
a great presence.  There was an increase in letters to editors and an 
increase in LGBTI people being on the radio, responding to 
homophobic vitriol.  I think there was a claiming of citizenship and 
public space in the one-year process that was very important.207 
 Other activists echoed Melanie Judge’s sentiment.  For example, 
David Bilchitz made clear that he does not believe that the rights of 
minority groups should be subject to majority approval, yet he also 
emphasized that “social attitudes are important and the opportunity to 
force a public discussion on this question [of same-sex marriage] was 
a good call.  Homosexuality was the love that dare not speak its name, 
                                                 
 205. See ‘Counting the Gay Faces’: Interview with Glenn de Swardt, in TO HAVE AND 
TO HOLD: THE MAKING OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 23, at 111-12 
(discussing the “shift in the media as [a] result of the same-sex marriage process”); Interview 
with Melanie Judge, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Aug. 4, 2014) (noting changes in media 
coverage). 
 206. The public hearings were conducted between September and October 2006.  For 
a government report on these hearings, see A Report of the Portfolio Committee on Home 
Affairs on Peoples’ Public Hearings in Provinces on the Civil Union Bill, 20 September to 09 
October 2006, and the Public Submissions, PARLIAMENTARY MONITORING GROUP, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2006/061031hearings.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2016). 
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but the legislative process forced a discussion.”208  The amplification 
of LGBTI voices in public discourse made a lasting impact.  “Even if 
you look at media representations after the Civil Union Act, I think 
you see a media representation that speaks to queer realities.  [The 
grace period] put queer lives and bodies into a broader public 
realm.”209 
 Had the Constitutional Court read same-sex marriage into the 
law immediately, the media probably would have featured stories of 
same-sex weddings during the court decision’s immediate aftermath.  
In contrast, the yearlong grace period created an extended period of 
public discussion, expanding opportunities for same-sex couples to 
engage the public and the media.  To be sure, the public hearings and 
media accounts also provided space to individuals who expressed 
their disgust with same-sex relationships.  While hostile remarks can 
be hurtful to LGBTI people, activists said that the grace period was 
important nonetheless.210  In fact, Melanie Judge said that homophobic 
outrage during the grace period made it all the more clear that LGBTI 
rights activists needed to engage the public in discussions to challenge 
prejudices, whereas their energy had previously focused on quietly 
achieving victories in court.211   This public dialogue was facilitated by 
the public hearings and media coverage during the grace period. 
                                                 
 208. Interview with David Bilchitz, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 22, 2015); see also 
Videoconference Interview with Fikile Vilakazi (June 14, 2015) (“What was good was that 
[the remedial delay] opened up a national dialog.”). 
 209. See sources cited supra note 208.  It is worth noting that, while the public 
hearings opened up conversations about LGBTI people, they had their limitations.  For 
example, Zethu Matebeni believes that the potential of the public hearings was not fully 
realized.  She wishes that the deliberations would have focused less narrowly on access to 
marriage and, instead, situated the issue of same-sex marriage in broader critiques of 
heteronormativity and patriarchy.  Telephone Interview (via Skype) with Zethu Matebeni 
(Aug. 27, 2015). 
 210. David Bilchitz explained: 
Sometimes [the public hearings] became opportunities to vent homophobia.  They 
were not friendly to LGBTI people.  Some LGBTI people were scared to express 
themselves.  So there’s a real question about how to run public consultations . . . 
but they certainly forced the discussion and there was a lot of media around them.  
I have a problem with the notion that LGBTI rights are subject to majority 
approval, but at the same time, social attitudes are important and the opportunity to 
force a public discussion on this question [of same-sex marriage] was a good 
call. . . .  Homosexuality was the love that dare not speak its name, but the 
legislative process forced a discussion. 
Interview with David Bilchitz, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 22, 2015). 
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 One high-profile example of how such conversations changed 
hearts and minds is that of Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, Minister of 
Home Affairs during the grace period, and her husband Charles 
Nqakula, then-Minister of Safety and Security.  Minister Mapisa-
Nqakula acknowledged that she and her husband originally had 
difficulty accepting Fourie.212  However, the deliberative process 
following Fourie was transformative.  Recognizing this change in 
attitude, she stated: “We would attend a gay wedding, definitely.  We 
have matured so much.  This process was, for both of us, a personal 
growth, I must say.”213  According to this account, Minister Mapisa-
Nqakula grew to support same-sex marriage not simply to comply 
with the Constitutional Court’s order, but because she and her 
husband came to appreciate the significance of marriage equality. 
 The grace period obviously did not convert all opponents of 
same-sex marriage into supporters like Minister Mapisa-Nqakula and 
her husband.  Homosexuality and same-sex marriage continue to be 
controversial.214  The grace period seems, however, to have helped 
humanize the issue of same-sex marriage by fostering a yearlong 
public dialogue about the injustices of excluding same-sex couples 
from marriage.  This humanization is an important step toward 
changing hearts and minds in South Africa. 
 To be sure, a limitation of my case study is that I do not have 
public opinion data for assessing the extent to which hearts and minds 
actually changed.  One could reasonably expect, however, that the 
increased visibility of LGBTI people helped to cultivate social 
acceptance of same-sex marriage.  A wealth of social science research 
                                                                                                             
Prior to the one-year period, marriage equality was very much waged outside of the 
public eye.  It was pushed through by legal finesse.  The suspension period finally 
forced the public conversation, however horrific it was.  It was very shocking for 
me to [hear vitriolic comments] and realize how out of sync the law reform 
strategy was with the broader debates.  We hadn’t done the important work of 
building a culture of equality through public education advocacy work, and the 
suspension period opened up a space for that work. 
Interview with Melanie Judge, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Aug. 4, 2014). 
 212. See Brendan Boyle, Gay Marriage Bill ‘Moving, Painful,’ SUNDAY TIMES (S. 
Afr.), Nov. 19, 2006, at 15 (quoting Minister Mapisa-Nqakula). 
 213. Id. 
 214. According to a 2013 survey of people in Gauteng, South Africa’s most populous 
province, 71% of respondents “believe that gay and lesbian people deserve equal rights with 
other South Africans,” but 13%, roughly “the equivalent of 1,2 million people, believe that it 
is acceptable to be violent towards gay and lesbian people.” Guy Trangoš, LGBTI Attitudes 
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suggests that sharing personal stories from gays and lesbians generally 
reduces biases based on sexual orientation.215  This literature supports 
the idea that amplifying LGBTI voices during the grace period helped 
to cultivate social acceptance of same-sex marriage. 
4. Allowing Provisional Compromise 
 A fourth feature of the grace period was the possibility of 
compromise.  Had the Constitutional Court implemented same-sex 
marriage by judicial decree, there would have been no exceptions for 
civil marriage officials who object to performing same-sex marriages 
based on conscience; these exceptions currently exist under the Civil 
Union Act.216 
 As noted earlier, LGBTI rights advocates have criticized the 
exceptions for civil marriage officials as unconstitutional, but ten 
years have passed, and they have not challenged the exceptions in 
court.217  While advocates believe the exceptions are an affront to the 
equality and dignity of same-sex couples, the exceptions have been a 
relatively small problem for LGBTI communities.218  Instead of 
expending resources on challenging the exceptions, advocates have 
focused their attention on addressing much graver issues, such as 
violent hate crimes against LGBTI individuals, especially a troubling 
pattern of so-called corrective rape crimes targeting black lesbians in 
townships.219 
                                                 
 215. See Holning Lau, Charles Q. Lau & Kelley Loper, Public Opinion in Hong Kong 
About Gays and Lesbians: The Impact of Interpersonal and Imagined Contact, 26 INT’L J. 
PUB. OPINION RES. 301, 304-06 (2014) (summarizing existing research on how people’s 
attitudes are influenced by their exposure to gays and lesbians through media and other forms 
of storytelling). 
 216. See Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 6 (S. Afr.). 
 217. See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Bilchitz with Judge, supra note 132. 
 219. All of my interview subjects listed hate crimes as a priority issue.  Advocacy on 
this front includes preventing violence through education, as well as ensuring that victims of 
violence are treated fairly by law enforcement, healthcare professionals, and other social 
service providers.  Racial and class-based disparities influence the risk of victimization, and 
activists are becoming more attuned to this intersectionality.  See, e.g., Interview with 
Melanie Judge, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Aug. 4, 2014) (“The last four or five years, I think 
there’s been a real shift in queer activism.  You’ve seen a reemergence of grassroots voices 
that is articulating a politics that is much more intersectional and much more nuanced.”).  
Zackie Achmat, however, emphasized that activists still have a long way to go “to break out 
of the ghetto of queer identity” and advance truly intersectional politics.  Interview with 
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 The grace period allowed Parliament to broker the compromise 
embodied by the exception for conscientious objectors.  The 
arrangement is arguably provisional because a successful 
constitutional challenge against the conscientious objector exceptions 
seems likely.220  Nonetheless, this compromise helped to mitigate 
tensions when South Africa was grappling with the legalization of 
same-sex marriage.221  The grace period made this stabilizing 
compromise possible. 
 If the court had created same-sex marriage by reading it into 
existing law, Parliament might have passed legislation after the fact to 
create exceptions for marriage officials who object on grounds of 
conscience.222  One can speculate, however, that carving out 
exceptions after the court fully implemented same-sex marriage by 
decree would have had a different effect.  This course of events might 
have created a more difficult pill for supporters of same-sex marriage 
to swallow.  Commentators have suggested that people feel 
particularly wronged when the government chips away at an existing 
and operational right, as opposed to denying or circumscribing the 
right before it becomes implemented.223 
                                                 
 220. See, e.g., de Vos, supra note 104, at 463 (explaining that the conscientious 
objector provision for civil marriage officers “clearly endorses sexual orientation 
discrimination by state officials and will most probably be struck down by the Constitutional 
Court if challenged”). 
 221. See Editorial, State of the Union, supra note 176: 
The Civil Union Bill could be seen in the same way as some of the political 
reforms that were introduced in the dying days of the apartheid era.  They did not 
go nearly far enough, but served as a means of persuading a conservative society to 
accept long-overdue change without provoking avoidable conflict.  The sky did not 
fall in, and racial attitudes have progressed rapidly since then. 
 222. For an example of this order of events, consider the state of North Carolina, 
where the legislature passed a law allowing court officials to refuse to perform marriages 
based on their religious beliefs; this legislation was passed in response to a federal lawsuit 
that gave same-sex couples in North Carolina the right to marry.  See Jonathan M. Katz, 
North Carolina Allows Officials To Refuse To Perform Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 
2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/us/north-carolina-allows-officials-to-refuse-to-perform- 
gay-marriages.html?_r=0. 
 223. E.g., Craig J. Konnoth, Revoking Rights, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1365, 1375-85 (2015) 
(applying the notion of endowment effects to the context of repealing rights); see also Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 
86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1318–19 (1998) (“People react more negatively to being deprived of 
something that they have had than to being denied something that they have never had.  
Behavioral economists and cognitive psychologists refer to this phenomenon as the 
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5. Weaving the Themes Together and Identifying Remaining 
Questions 
 Taken together, the four themes suggest that the grace period 
was relatively successful in achieving the goals that Justice Sachs 
articulated in the majority opinion.  The grace period contributed to 
the perceived legitimacy of both same-sex marriage and the role of 
the Constitutional Court, thereby mitigating potential backlash against 
marriage equality and the court.  The interviews I conducted confirm 
this overall assessment of the grace period.  Nearly all the LGBTI 
rights advocates said they believed that the grace period served a 
legitimizing function.  Many activists who initially denounced the 
remedial delay now see things differently.  As David Bilchitz 
explained: “A lot of LGBTI people were upset originally, but I think 
many of us in the campaign have changed our minds.  I initially 
thought Justice O’Regan was right.  I was rather outraged that the 
court hadn’t gone in her direction.  Today, I think the majority was 
actually right.”224 
 The legitimizing force of the grace period was perhaps 
particularly important in light of the threat of backlash against LGBTI 
people in South Africa.  Even with the grace period, there was a wave 
of backlash immediately after Fourie.  According to Fikile Vilakazi, 
the frequency of reported hate-based violent crimes spiked.225  “Rape 
and killings intensified in that period—brutal kinds of murder and 
mutilation.”226  It is unclear whether there were actually more crimes 
or whether the Fourie ruling emboldened more victims to speak up, 
but hate crimes were more visible during the period just after the 
ruling.  “It was like a state of war.”227  In light of this backlash, the 
grace period’s legitimizing function becomes all the more relevant.  
One could reasonably posit that backlash against LGBTI people 
might have been even more severe without the legitimizing and 
humanizing processes of the grace period. 
 Many of the advocates I interviewed shared the view that the 
majority in Fourie had been vindicated for allowing the grace 
period.228  That sentiment, however, was not unanimous.  Not everyone 
                                                 
 224. Interview with David Bilchitz, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 22, 2015). 
 225. Videoconference Interview with Fikile Vilakazi (June 14, 2015). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Interview with Zackie Achmat, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Aug. 5, 2014) 
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agreed that the boost to legitimacy outweighed the costs of delaying 
justice.229  Jonathan Berger, in particular, focused on the sad reality 
that Marié Fourie and her partner Cecelia Bonthuys never married 
because Fourie passed away during the grace period.230  One is left to 
wonder how many similar tragedies resulted from the remedial delay.  
Jonathan Berger acknowledged that “there was certainly value in the 
majority party getting its members in line to push the Civil Union Bill 
through.  It took away the argument that same-sex marriage was 
created by just judges.  There’s the legitimacy of the Civil Union Bill 
being passed by Parliament.”231  However, he disagreed that the 
majority in Fourie had been vindicated.  “Fourie and Bonthuys never 
got married because Fourie died and, for me, that’s not vindication.  
The very person who brought the case never got to benefit from it.”232 
 Some of my interview subjects emphasized the importance of 
safeguarding the reputation of the court.  For example, Zackie Achmat 
noted that the Constitutional Court decided Fourie after having issued 
other unpopular decisions in areas such as the abolition of the death 
penalty, protection of criminal defendants’ rights, the 
decriminalization of sodomy, and other gay rights cases.233  “The court 
became known as the court that protected criminals and the evil.”234  In 
contrast, the court won popular approval when it ordered state 
                                                                                                             
strategy,” and stating that “it’s vital that we win battles in the streets and in Parliament, and 
that the courts should be the very last resort”); Interview with Anonymous, in S. Afr. (Aug. 
5, 2014) (notes on file with author) (“The one-year period served the function of legitimacy.  
In terms of how things work in South Africa, it was important to do it right procedurally.”) 
Interview with Melanie Judge, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Aug. 4, 2014) (“Justice delayed was 
justice denied . . . but legality doesn’t happen in a social vacuum, and at some level I became 
very alive to the importance of lending legitimacy to legal remedies . . . I saw the importance 
of bringing the law reform to a public space.”). 
 229. Not all the interviewees had clear feelings about how to weigh the costs and 
benefits of the grace period.  In the wake of Fourie, the press quoted Fikile Vilakazi for her 
criticism of the grace period.  E.g., Mabuza, supra note 148; Natasha Marrian, Gay Delay 
Dismay, CITIZEN (S. Afr.), Dec. 2, 2005, at 1-2. Fikile Vilakazi’s feelings are now a lot more 
complicated.  “I vaccilate,” she said.  She explained that she is now “grateful” for the one-
year grace period because it played an enormous role in sensitizing the public to same-sex 
marriage and the equal citizenship of LGBTI people; yet she still feels “robbed” of full 
marriage equality because of the compromises in the Civil Union Act.  Videoconference 
Interview with Fikile Vilakazi (June 14, 2015).  Most of my other interview subjects, 
however, placed less weight on the compromises embodied in the Civil Union Act, viewing 
them as rather minimal. 
 230. Interview with Jonathan Berger, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 21, 2015). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Interview with Zackie Achmat, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Aug. 5, 2014). 
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healthcare facilities to offer antiretroviral drugs to HIV-positive 
pregnant women.235  This was an important antidote to unpopular 
cases.  Zackie Achmat emphasized that it is important for the court to 
mitigate tensions between the judiciary and the people as well as the 
political branches.  If these other social actors were to perceive the 
court as illegitimate and begin ignoring judicial rulings, “the state of 
legal anarchy would be very dangerous for the protection of 
vulnerable people in society.”236  Therefore, he said, “Justice 
O’Regan’s dissent was correct in law and in morality, but wrong in 
strategy.”237 
 The Fourie grace period provides a contrast to the remedial delay 
in Brown II, which has elicited nearly universal criticism for failing to 
adequately remedy the problem of racial segregation.238  Even after 
acknowledging downsides, such as the unfortunate passing of Marié 
Fourie, it is difficult to ignore the successful legitimizing function of 
the grace period.  At the very least, the grace period following Fourie 
complicates previous understandings of remedial delays, forcing us to 
grapple more seriously with their potential benefits. 
 The South African Constitutional Court took a gamble with the 
grace period in Fourie.  Parliament could have rebuked the court, 
allowing the grace period to expire without enacting legislation to 
legalize same-sex marriage.  Based on the data, it is difficult to say 
why the ANC ultimately chose action over inaction.  One could 
speculate the ANC was motivated by a variety of factors, ranging 
from fidelity to constitutional principles to the potential political 
benefits of presenting South Africa to the world as an international 
                                                 
 235. See Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 703 (CC) (S. 
Afr.). 
 236. Interview with Zackie Achmat, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Aug. 5, 2014). 
 237. Id.  Some interviewees noted that criticism of the South African Constitutional 
Court is framed less often in terms of judicial activism than it is in the United States.  This is 
partly because the South African Constitution guarantees a broad range of positive rights, and 
the public generally understands that the court has a role in actively holding the government 
accountable for advancing those rights through policy reforms.  See Interview with Jonathan 
Berger, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 21, 2015); Interview with David Bilchitz, in 
Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 22, 2015).  Instead, criticisms of the court are framed in terms of 
immorality and violations of African culture.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 182; see also 
Interview with Zackie Achmat, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Aug. 5, 2014) (noting criticisms of 
the court for protecting “criminals and the evil”). 
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leader in human rights.239  Examining such speculation is beyond the 
scope of this project. 
 It is also unclear what legitimacy costs would have accrued if 
Parliament had rebuked the Constitutional Court.  Different 
possibilities exist.  It could be that both same-sex marriage and the 
reputation of the Constitutional Court would have been undermined 
because Parliament’s inaction would have reinforced beliefs that 
same-sex marriage is the radical creation of an out-of-touch and 
activist court.  In contrast, it could be that, even if the court needed to 
read same-sex marriage into the Marriage Act at the end of the grace 
period, the year might have helped to shift public opinion on the issue 
by creating a space for LGBTI advocates to share their stories and 
humanize the issue.  A more neutral outcome is also conceivable; 
perhaps the public would have perceived the reading of same-sex 
marriage into the Marriage Act no differently if it were to happen 
when Fourie was decided or if it were to occur one year later.  Indeed, 
what would have happened if Parliament rebuked the court remains a 
matter of speculation.  As the following Part explains, looking at case 
studies beyond South Africa could provide a better understanding of 
the costs associated with grace periods in which political branches do 
not follow the court’s directions. 
IV. BEYOND SOUTH AFRICA 
 While Fourie’s grace period was successful in enhancing the 
legitimacy of the court and same-sex marriage, we ought to remain 
mindful that there are good reasons to avoid recourse to remedial 
delays.  As noted earlier, there are costs associated with delaying 
justice.  In addition, Fourie’s success at mitigating backlash might be 
difficult to replicate in other issue areas and in other parts of the world 
because of different contextual factors. 
 Assuming that judges act—and will continue to act—
strategically to mitigate backlash, what is the most principled way to 
determine whether a remedial grace period is appropriate?  This Part 
of the Article begins by exploring some of the factors that should 
influence assessment of remedial grace periods’ appropriateness in 
                                                 
 239. For discussions about the benefits that states enjoy vis-à-vis other states when 
they are considered human rights leaders, see Holning Lau, Human Rights and Globalization: 
Putting the Race to the Top in Perspective, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 2021 (2008); David S. Law, 
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different contexts around the world.  Afterwards, I focus specifically 
on Europe.  I present a thought experiment on how remedial grace 
periods could potentially improve the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights.  By making use of remedial grace periods, 
the court could become emboldened to recognize rights it currently 
avoids recognizing due to its political constraints. 
A. Grace Periods and Contextual Factors 
 What are some contextual factors that affect the appropriateness 
of a judicially crafted grace period?240  The following discussion 
examines four categories of factors worthy of consideration: (1) the 
costs and benefits of delaying justice, (2) alternative delay tactics, 
(3) the sociopolitical landscape that influences the likelihood of 
political branches cooperating during the grace period, and (4) the 
conditions of the proposed grace period. 
 There certainly are costs associated with remedial grace periods.  
If there are no structural reasons to defer decision-making to the 
political branches,241 delaying justice for strategic reasons alone can be 
an abdication of judicial responsibility for addressing rights 
violations.242  In some cases, the costs of delaying justice would be 
particularly striking.  For example, the South African Constitutional 
Court ruled in 1995 that the death penalty was unconstitutional.243  
Imagine if the court had suspended its declaration of invalidity, giving 
Parliament one year to reform its criminal code while allowing 
                                                 
 240. In this discussion, I assume that we are talking about a court that is correct on the 
merits of a case, yet still worries about potential backlash.  Our analysis would be more 
complicated if we were to assume that a court lacks competency to make a sound 
determination on the merits.  While it is beyond the scope of this Article to examine that 
scenario in detail, it is worth noting that, if a court lacks competency to decide a case 
correctly, a grace period might be desirable because it would allow political actors to override 
the judicial decision before it gets implemented.  See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 156-61, 183-
85 (discussing judicial fallibility).  Political actors can pursue override through constitutional 
amendment, among other options. 
 241. For our earlier discussion about differences between structural and strategic 
motivations for remedial delay, see supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.  For 
elaborations on the desirability of remedial delay in cases animated primarily by structural 
concerns, see, for example, KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE 152-54 (2001) (defending the practice of delaying 
remedies in Canadian cases); Robert Leckey, The Harms of Remedial Discretion, 14 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. (forthcoming) (critiquing purported justifications for remedial delays in Canada 
and South Africa). 
 242. See sources cited supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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executions in the meantime.  Losing lives to state executions during 
the grace period would have been an extremely severe and irreversible 
cost of remedial delay.  In contrast, denying a same-sex couple the 
right to marriage for one year poses a less jarring set of costs unless 
the same-sex couple faces exigent circumstances, such as illness or 
the deportation of a noncitizen partner.244 
 While the death penalty provides an extreme example where 
costs of delaying justice likely outweigh benefits, we can also imagine 
an example at the other end of the spectrum.  Backlash against 
unpopular court decisions could galvanize violence against the social 
groups that the decisions are meant to protect.  In addition, backlash 
against the judiciary can undermine the long-term health of the rule of 
law.  Consider a hypothetical in which a constitutional court intends to 
rule in favor of a minority group’s rights, but is aware that the decision 
will provoke a brutal mass campaign of violence against this minority 
group, and the executive branch of government is likely to turn a blind 
eye to such violence.  In this case, I believe a court decision to delay 
its remedy to mitigate violence seems not merely defensible, but 
desirable.245 
 Of course, most cases are likely to pose more difficult 
determinations than the two stylized hypotheticals I offered.  To 
determine whether delaying justice is warranted, judges will need to 
ascertain the level of risk posed by backlash and weigh them against 
the benefits of delaying justice.  Courts should be vigilant not to 
cower to just any threat of backlash and, instead, employ delay tactics 
sparingly.246  To be sure, weighing the costs and benefits of delaying 
justice is difficult, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a 
methodology for this assessment.  For now, my more modest goal is to 
spotlight the highly contextualized nature of weighing costs and 
benefits. 
 Even if we conclude that delaying justice makes good sense in a 
particular case, a grace period might not be the best delay strategy.  
Thus, the second factor for consideration is the availability and 
                                                 
 244. For further discussion on grace periods’ potential harm to rights holders, see 
Leckey, supra note 241 (critiquing Canadian examples of remedial delay involving the rights 
of sex workers and the right to assisted suicide). 
 245. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 170-82 (arguing that, in at least some cases, a court 
is correct to take public sentiment into consideration because the court’s actions could 
produce perverse consequences). 
 246. See id. at 159 (discussing the possibility that judicial consideration of potential 
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relative appeal of alternatives to remedial delay.  As discussed in Part 
II, grace periods like the one in Fourie are not the only means for 
delay.  For example, commentators widely believe that the U.S. 
Supreme Court delayed legalizing same-sex marriage nationwide, but 
the Court did not use a grace period to do so.247  Instead, it employed a 
variety of tactics to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of state-level 
same-sex marriage bans.248  The U.S. approach to delaying the 
legalization of same-sex marriage is a potential alternative to the 
South African approach in Fourie. 
 Courts around the world can consider delaying rulings instead of 
delaying remedies.249  However, in some judicial systems, the 
approach of the U.S. Supreme Court is impossible due to structural 
limitations.  For example, in South Africa, the Constitutional Court 
has much less discretion to decline hearing cases.  If a South African 
lower court declares a law to be unconstitutional, the Constitutional 
Court is obligated to hear the case and decide whether to affirm the 
lower court ruling.250  In contrast, if a lower federal court in the United 
States holds that a state’s same-sex marriage ban is unconstitutional, 
that ruling is binding even if the case is not subsequently heard and 
decided by the Supreme Court.251  This difference in judicial structures 
makes it less feasible for the South African Constitutional Court—and 
for other similarly situated courts—to avoid deciding cases on their 
merits. 
 Additionally, high courts in many judicial systems do not have a 
network of lower courts on which they can rely to develop a corpus of 
supportive jurisprudence that mitigates controversy the way that lower 
court decisions proliferated and supported the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Obergefell.252  Even in the United States, state supreme courts 
                                                 
 247. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Cf. Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative 
Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1 (2016) (explaining that the strategic use of justiciability doctrines 
is more opaque than the strategic use of remedial delays and that such opacity is sometimes 
beneficial). 
 250. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 8, §§ 167-69, 172(2)(a). 
 251. In the United States, lower courts’ same-sex marriage decisions were binding 
after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); and Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 265 (2014). 
 252. For our earlier discussion on the proliferation of supportive lower court opinions 
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typically cannot punt to lower courts the way that the Supreme Court 
can.  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach of delaying ruling on 
same-sex marriage while waiting for a corpus of lower court rulings 
to develop is inapposite to some judicial contexts.  In a jurisdiction 
where tools for delaying rulings are limited or nonexistent, the 
strategy of delaying remedies may be particularly appealing.253 
 Jurisdictions like Canada and South Africa are arguably 
particularly well-positioned to use remedial grace periods to mitigate 
backlash because they already used grace periods frequently in other 
cases where remedial delays are animated by structural concerns.254  
Expanding the use of remedial grace periods in these jurisdictions 
may be relatively less controversial, as compared to jurisdictions like 
the United States, which has a much more limited history of remedial 
delays, Brown II notwithstanding.  The contrast that I have drawn here 
is just one example of how different delay tactics might fit different 
jurisdictions better.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore 
comprehensively how to weigh different delay tactics against each 
other.  Rather, my goal is to underscore the relevance of this inquiry. 
 The third factor for consideration when determining whether to 
adopt a grace period is the likelihood of political branches 
cooperating.  Failure to elicit such cooperation could exacerbate 
attacks against a court decision.  For example, had the South African 
Parliament not followed the court’s instructions in Fourie, tension 
between branches of government might have enflamed public 
accusations that same-sex marriage is an illegitimate institution forced 
upon the country by a small number of unelected judicial activists.255  
If political branches are unlikely to cooperate with the judiciary, the 
judiciary may be better off crafting a remedy without delay.  Of 
course, the likelihood of eliciting cooperation from the political 
branches is extremely context specific, depending on the 
sociopolitical landscape of the particular jurisdiction.  Political 
branches might be especially unwilling to cooperate when the 
segment of society that opposes the judicial decision is powerful and 
                                                 
 253. Cf. Delaney, supra note 249 (examining “various doctrinal approaches to 
strategic legitimation” and illustrating that “not all approaches are available to all courts”). 
 254. For our earlier discussion on the difference between strategic and structural 
motivations for remedial delays, see supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.  For general 
background on remedial delays in South African and Canadian cases, see Leckey, supra note 
241. 
 255. For a more detailed discussion of the legitimacy costs that might have emerged 





310 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:259 
 
can effectively use the grace period to organize retaliation against the 
court. 
 Finally, the conditions of the grace period—including expiration 
and the latitude given to the other branches of government during the 
grace period—are additional considerations.  The experience of 
Brown II suggests that courts should be wary of grace periods with no 
deadlines.256  Courts should set grace period deadlines to hold the 
other branches of government accountable.  In setting a deadline 
length, courts should consider how fast the other branches of 
government are capable of working, as well as the magnitude of harm 
that delaying justice would inflict on plaintiffs and other stakeholders. 
 The deadline should be accompanied by an appropriate default 
solution that becomes law if the political branches fail to act.  In the 
Fourie case, same-sex marriage would have been read into the 
Marriage Act if Parliament or the President failed to comply with the 
grace period.257  Outside of South Africa, some grace period deadlines 
have been accompanied by much more ambiguous defaults.  For 
example, grace periods related to same-sex marriage and transgender 
marriage have expired in Colombia and Hong Kong, respectively.258  
In both cases, the legislative branches failed to act, leaving interested 
parties in legal limbo because the courts did not clearly articulate 
what should happen if the legislative branches fail to comply with the 
courts’ directives.259  As a result, subsequent litigation may be 
necessary for the courts to clarify what happens next.260 
                                                 
 256. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
 257. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at paras. 157-62 (S. 
Afr.). 
 258. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia 
C-577/11 (Colom.) (setting a two-year grace period); W. v. Registrar of Marriages, [2013] 16 
H.K.C.F.A.R. 112 (C.F.A.) (H.K.) (setting a one-year grace period). 
 259. The Constitutional Court of Colombia had said that, if Congress failed to pass 
legislation within two years, judges and notaries could begin formalizing same-sex 
relationships.  “But the court’s language was vague” because it did not specify what type of 
formalization would satisfy constitutional requirements, and “gay couples have been in 
limbo.”  Brodzinsky & Tuckman, supra note 19; see also El ‘viacrucis’ del matrimonio gay, 
SEMANA (Colom.) (Feb. 28, 2015, 22:00), http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-
viacrucis-del-matrimonio-gay/419340-3 (discussing disagreements about whether judges and 
notaries are to formalize same-sex relationships through marriage or an alternative structure). 
 The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal held that the transgender woman in W. had a 
right to be recognized as a woman for the purposes of marriage.  W. 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 112.  
The court also directed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council to pass a law defining the criteria 
for determining when an individual qualifies to be recognized in a gender other than the 
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 In setting conditions for the grace period, a court might also 
strike a political compromise by allowing the other branches of 
government some latitude in deciding the substance of the remedy.  
For example, if there is a real threat that demanding marriage equality 
could provoke devastating backlash, a court might decide to grant the 
legislature latitude to decide between legislating same-sex marriage 
and other forms of recognition, such as civil partnerships, even though 
the same-sex couples sought marriage rights.261  From a doctrinal 
standpoint, this latitude may very well be unprincipled because civil 
partnerships might not satisfy a strict application of constitutional 
doctrine.262  From a realist standpoint, however, civil partnerships 
might be preferable if legalizing same-sex marriage seems certain to 
provoke debilitating backlash.  In cases of compromise, the grace 
period would not only delay remediation, but also deny full 
remediation for strategic reasons.263 
                                                                                                             
If such legislation does not eventuate, it would fall to the Courts, applying 
constitutional principles, statutory provisions and the rules of common law, to 
decide questions regarding the implications of recognizing an individual’s acquired 
gender for marriage purposes as and when any disputed questions arise.  That 
would not, in our view, pose insuperable difficulties. 
W., 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. at para. 147. 
 260. In Colombia, there is now a new same-sex marriage case pending before the 
Constitutional Court.  See Brodzinsky & Tuckman, supra note 19.  Whether an extended 
period of remedial delay, caused by the lack of a clear default rule, is appropriate will depend 
on a cost-benefit analysis.  See discussion supra notes 239-244 and accompanying text. 
 261. There is widespread belief that the Vermont Supreme Court struck this type of 
compromise for strategic reasons in Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).  E.g., 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 72; Jacobi, supra note 72.  In Baker, the court permitted Vermont’s 
legislature to recognize same-sex relationships by creating a status equal to, but separate 
from, marriage. 744 A.2d at 864-89.  The legislature consequently created civil unions.  Note 
that civil unions in Vermont were defined differently than they are in South Africa’s Civil 
Union Act, which uses the term “civil union” as an umbrella term that subsumes marriage.  
In the hypothetical above, I borrow the term “civil partnerships” from the context of the 
United Kingdom, which established civil partnerships in 2004 as a separate status parallel to 
marriage.  See Civil Partnership Act 2004, c. 33 (Eng.). 
 262. Numerous courts have held that denying same-sex couples access to marriage is 
unconstitutional, even if the state grants same-sex couples all the equivalent rights and 
responsibilities of marriage through a registration scheme of another name.  E.g., Kerrigan v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Ops. of the Justices to the Senate, 802 
N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004). 
 263. For an elaboration on the distinction between strategic delays and strategic rights 
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B. Thought Experiment: European Court of Human Rights 
 In this subpart, I offer a thought experiment based on the 
European Court of Human Rights.  I use this exercise to examine how 
remedial delay could, perhaps counterintuitively, advance the delivery 
of justice.  Consider the same-sex marriage case of Schalk & Kopf v. 
Austria.264  The applicants contended that Austria’s refusal to let them 
marry violated the fundamental right to marry in article 12 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, as well as article 14’s 
prohibition on discrimination, taken in conjunction with article 8’s 
protection of privacy and family life.265  As discussed earlier, in Schalk 
& Kopf the court refused to recognize the right of same-sex couples 
to marry.266 
 The court’s decision was animated largely by its consensus 
doctrine.267  While the court refused to recognize a right to same-sex 
marriage, it signaled that it would probably recognize such a right in 
the near future once enough member states legalize same-sex 
marriage to constitute a consensus on the issue.268  The court did not 
clearly explain how many member states would be necessary to form 
a consensus, but it implied that a majority would suffice.  The court 
stated: “[T]here is not yet a majority of States providing for legal 
recognition of same-sex couples.  The area in question must therefore 
still be regarded as one of evolving rights with no established 
consensus.”269  The consensus doctrine allowed the court to delay 
rights recognition.  Many commentators believe that the court 
developed the consensus doctrine as a strategic tool for mitigating 
backlash.270 
                                                 
 264. Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 67. 
 268. Schalk & Kopf, no. 30141/04, ¶¶ 58-59. 
 269. Id. ¶ 105. 
 270. See Robert Wintemute, Consensus Is the Right Approach for the European Court 
of Human Rights, GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
law/2010/aug/12/european-court-human-rights-consensus (stating that the consensus 
approach prevents “political backlash, which could cause some governments to threaten to 
leave the convention system”); see also R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in 
THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 122 (R. St. J. 
Macdonald et al. eds., 1993) (“The margin of appreciation gives the flexibility needed to 
avoid damaging confrontations between the Court and Contracting States.”); Eva Brems, The 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
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 For our thought experiment, imagine that the court had not 
delayed rights recognition, but instead opted for delaying the 
remedy.271  As commentators have explained elsewhere, the court very 
well could have drawn on its gay rights jurisprudence to conclude that 
same-sex couples have a right to marry.272  The court has repeatedly 
held that differential treatment based on sexual orientation “require[s] 
particularly serious reasons by way of justification.”273  For the 
purposes of our thought experiment, let us assume that this principle 
logically leads to the conclusion that member states’ bans on same-sex 
marriage cannot be justified.  Imagine that the court recognized the 
right to same-sex marriage; however, to temper backlash, the court 
granted member states a grace period for achieving marriage equality. 
 The terms of the grace period could be determined by 
consensus.  The court could state that the grace period would reach an 
end once enough member states legalize same-sex marriage to 
constitute a consensus.  At that point in time, laggard member states 
would be expected to legalize same-sex marriage immediately and 
individuals could bring grievances to the court if member states fail to 
do so.  In this thought experiment, the consensus doctrine is used to 
delay remediation, instead of delaying rights recognition. 
 What significance is there to the difference between the original 
outcome in Schalk & Kopf and the outcome of our thought 
experiment?  At first, the difference might seem inconsequential 
because in both instances, the court does not require Austria to 
legalize same-sex marriage immediately.  Furthermore, in both 
instances, the court exercises judicial restraint by deferring to member 
states through the consensus doctrine.  Yet, upon closer look, 
significant differences between the two approaches begin to appear.  
First of all, opting for remedial delay, instead of delaying rights 
recognition, enhances doctrinal consistency.  In Schalk & Kopf, the 
court veered from case law that vigorously reviews differential 
treatment based on sexual orientation.274  Instead of actively reviewing 
                                                                                                             
J. INT’L L.] 240, 304 (1996) (suggesting that the margin of appreciation doctrine promotes 
“friendly relations” between the ECHR and Contracting States). 
 271. For elaboration on the distinction between delaying rights recognition versus 
delaying remedial action, see supra subparts II.B-C. 
 272. See Wintemute, supra note 270 (“If the court applied human rights principles 
strictly, it would have found a violation.  The court . . . has said that a couple seeking to 
marry need not have capacity to procreate, or be of different sexes.”). 
 273. Schalk & Kopf, no. 30141/04, ¶ 97. 
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Austria’s same-sex marriage ban, the original Schalk & Kopf 
judgment simply invoked the consensus doctrine to defer to Austria’s 
decision to bar same-sex couples from marriage.275  Tension exists 
between the court’s history of vigorously reviewing differential 
treatment based on sexual orientation and its deference through the 
consensus doctrine.  Our thought experiment helps to reconcile that 
tension.  In our thought experiment, the court maintains fidelity to its 
previous gay rights cases, while still strategically deferring to member 
states through a reformulated consensus approach. 
 Moreover, the thought experiment produces a significantly 
different result because it prods member states toward marriage 
equality more forcefully than the original Schalk & Kopf opinion 
does.  In the thought experiment, the court does not require member 
states to implement same-sex marriage immediately, but announcing 
that there is a right to marriage equality is valuable in and of itself.  As 
William Eskridge has explained: “A court’s or a legislature’s 
announcement of an equality right serves an expressive function at the 
very least.”276  Indeed, when the court articulates the existence of a 
right, it shapes public dialogue about human rights norms. 
[O]fficial announcement of such a right [to equality] contributes to the 
creation of a public norm to that effect.  Public values and norms can 
influence private as well as public conduct.  More important, they can 
embolden their intended beneficiaries to demand better treatment from 
private as well as public authorities.277 
Thus, by announcing the right to marriage equality, the court could 
help the development of same-sex marriage as a human rights norm.278 
 This thought experiment illustrates that grace periods can be 
viewed from two different vantage points.  Whether a remedial grace 
period delays or accelerates the provision of justice depends on the 
baseline that one uses for comparison.  In the South African context, 
the dissenting opinion in Fourie provided a baseline for understanding 
the majority opinion.  Justice O’Regan’s dissenting approach would 
have legalized same-sex marriage immediately.  The dissenting 
                                                 
 275. Id. ¶¶ 58-59. 
 276. ESKRIDGE, supra note 72, at 153. 
 277. Id. 
 278. I recognize that my thought experiment will not satisfy commentators who 
resolutely oppose allowing consensus doctrine to shape any part of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ decision-making.  In this thought experiment, I chose to retain and modify 
the consensus doctrine to illustrate how adjusting the court’s existing doctrine, without 
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opinion thus reinforced the understanding that the majority opinion’s 
grace period delayed justice.  In contrast, our thought experiment 
offers a different view.  In the thought experiment, the European 
Court of Human Rights’ use of a remedial grace period would delay 
the implementation of same-sex marriage; however, it would 
ultimately accelerate the provision of justice when compared to what 
actually happened in Schalk & Kopf. 
 As previously stated, a careful assessment of the pros and cons 
of remedial delay required understanding the scope of alternative 
delay tactics.  In that spirit, our thought experiment about the 
European Court of Human Rights sheds light on how two different 
delay tactics—delaying rights recognition versus delaying 
remediation—can produce disparate outcomes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 This Article has sought to deepen our understanding of strategic 
grace periods and encourage greater conversation on this topic.  It did 
this in three ways.  First, it developed a three-part typology of strategic 
delay tactics: delaying rulings, delaying rights recognition, and 
delaying remedies.  This typology provides a framework for 
understanding how grace periods differ from other forms of delay.  
Second, this Article provided a case study of the remedial grace 
period following Fourie, South Africa’s landmark same-sex marriage 
decision.  Through a content analysis of newspaper articles and 
interviews with rights activists in South Africa, I found that, for the 
most part, the grace period enhanced the perceived legitimacy of the 
Constitutional Court and of same-sex marriage.  Third, building on 
the case study’s findings, this Article discussed how grace periods 
might be implemented in other parts of the world, including in the 
specific context of the European Court of Human Rights. 
 I hope this Article will spur further research and deeper 
discussions on strategic remedial delays.  To that end, I close by 
sharing some reflections from Justice Edwin Cameron, who has 
shaped my own thinking about future scholarly inquiries.  Justice 
Cameron joined the South African Constitutional Court after it 
decided Fourie.279  He is one of South Africa’s most high-profile 
                                                 
 279. Justice Cameron wrote the Supreme Court of Appeal’s majority opinion in 
Fourie before the case reached the Constitutional Court.  At that stage of litigation, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal did not address whether the Marriage Act was unconstitutional.  It 
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openly gay public figures and has been a vocal supporter of same-sex 
marriage rights.  I had the privilege of sitting down with Justice 
Cameron for a conversation about my research findings and 
remaining questions concerning strategic remedial delays. 
 Justice Cameron generously thanked me for studying Fourie and 
for illuminating ways in which remedial grace periods might mitigate 
criticism against courts and controversial rights protections.  In 
addition, he acknowledged that the Fourie delay, and consequent 
public debate, had beneficial effects.  At the same time, he highlighted 
some questions that warrant further consideration.  He remarked: 
“From a sociological perspective, it may well be true that delaying the 
provision of a remedy could mitigate backlash against a court ruling.  
I still worry, however, about judges accounting unduly for potential 
backlash when deciding cases.”280  Justice Cameron maintains that, 
from a legal perspective, Fourie’s remedial delay was “strictly 
speaking unprincipled, since in no other case not involving 
distributive rights or state resources has the court ever postponed a 
pure rights remedy.”281  Justice Cameron cautioned that “allowing 
judges to be influenced by fears of backlash could be dangerous, 
resulting in a judiciary that is overly reticent about protecting 
constitutional rights.”282  He questioned whether judges have the 
capacity to accurately assess the risk of public outcry and, 
accordingly, whether such evaluations should be part of a judge’s 
work.283 
 While this Article has shed light on a positive side of remedial 
grace periods, Justice Cameron’s comments remind us that we need to 
wrestle with heavy normative questions about the role of judges in 
choosing strategic remedial delays.  As explained in subpart IV.A, I 
believe that the magnitude of potential backlash can be severe enough 
to justify remedial grace periods in some cases, but I dodged the 
difficult question of how judges might go about evaluating the risk of 
backlash and guarding against excessive timidity in protecting rights.  
Future scholarship should grapple with this challenging inquiry.  
                                                                                                             
Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.).  The Supreme Court of Appeal held that 
the exclusion of same-sex couples from the common law concept of marriage was 
unconstitutional, and it granted immediate relief instead of suspending its order.  Fourie 2006 
(1) SA 524. 
 280. Interview with Edwin Cameron, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 25, 2015). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
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Future research should also examine a host of other lingering 
questions, including empirical questions about the impact of remedial 
grace periods beyond the South African experience.  We need 
additional research to understand fully the extent to which the South 
African experience is exceptional.  The marriage cases from 
Colombia and Hong Kong present fertile ground for additional case 
studies.  Using South Africa’s Fourie case as a vehicle, this Article has 
furthered our understanding of strategic remedial delays; it has also 
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APPENDIXES 
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Appendix 2: Search Periods for Content Analysis 
Appendix 2, Table 1: Description of Search Periods 
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Appendix 2, Table 2: Number of Articles Found Per Search Period** 
 1st Period 2nd Period 3rd Period 4th Period 
Dailies 
Daily Sun  4 0 1 23 
Sowetan 2 0 0 13 
Cape Argus 14 4 13 25 
The Citizen 15 0 6 24 
Business 
Day 




3 1 3 10 
Sunday Sun 3 2 0 13 
City Press 3 0 2 3 
Sunday 
World 
4 0 0 1 
                                                 
 ** The following newspaper issues were excluded from the dataset because they 
were missing from the National Library of South Africa’s archives: Daily Sun on Aug. 31 and 
Dec. 1, 2006; Cape Argus from Nov. 22-28, 2006; The Citizen on Nov. 27 & 28, 2006; and 
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Appendix 3: Coding Scheme 
Background Characteristics of Articles 
Each article, as a whole, was coded for the following background 
characteristics whenever applicable. 
• The newspaper in which the article appeared 
• Whether the newspaper was a daily or weekly 
• The search period in which the article appeared 
• The type of writing (news report, editorial, letter to the editor, 
vox populi, etc.) 
• Editorial position on same-sex marriage 
 
Primary Coding Categories for Statements Found in Each Article 
Below are the primary coding categories for content found in each 
article.  Secondary coding categories (not listed here) were also used 
to further classify content within the primary coding categories. 
• Description of judicial action 
• Description of actions taken by actors in Parliament  or the ANC 
• Description of actions taken by members of the President’s 
office 
• Description of actions taken by activists or other concerned 
citizens 
• Criticism of the Constitutional Court 
• Criticism of Parliament or the ANC 
• Criticism of the President or his administration 
• Criticism of the South African government generally 
• Criticism of legalizing same-sex marriage 
• Praise for the Constitutional Court 
• Praise for Parliament or the ANC 
• Praise for the President or his administration 
• Praise for the South African government generally 
• Praise for the legalization of same-sex marriage 
• Discussion of a proposed constitutional amendment 
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Appendix 4: Biographies of Activists Interviewed 
Zackie Achmat has long been a leading activist in South Africa.  He is 
cofounder and former Director of the National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality, former Director of the AIDS Law Project, 
cofounder and former Chairperson of the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC), cofounder of the Social Justice Coalition, and cofounder of the 
Centre for Law and Social Justice, subsequently renamed Ndifuna 
Ukwazi (Dare to Know), where he currently serves as Director.  In 
2003, Time magazine named Mr. Achmat one of its world heroes of 
the year, and the American Friends Service Committee nominated Mr. 
Achmat and TAC for a Nobel Peace Prize. 
Jonathan Berger is a former board chair of the Gay and Lesbian 
Equality Project (previously known as the National Coalition for Gay 
and Lesbian Equality).  While serving in that role, he was integrally 
involved in advocacy efforts that led to the legal recognition of same-
sex marriage in South Africa.  He was also an attorney at the AIDS 
Law Project during that time.  Prior to that, he clerked for Justice Kate 
O’Regan of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and served as the 
Legal Education and Advice Officer of the National Coalition for Gay 
and Lesbian Equality.  Mr. Berger presently practices law as an 
advocate of the High Court of South Africa and a member of the 
Johannesburg Society of Advocates. 
David Bilchitz worked as the chief legal advisor to OUT LGBT Well-
being, which spearheaded the same-sex marriage campaign of the 
Joint Working Group (a coalition of LGBTI organizations).  He is 
currently Professor of Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Law at 
the University of Johannesburg Faculty of Law, Secretary-General of 
the International Association of Constitutional Law, and Director of 
the South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, 
Human Rights and International Law (SAIFAC).  He is also a founder 
and former chair of Jewish Outlook: SA Jewish LGBTI Alliance. 
Melanie Judge worked on LGBTI advocacy at the Gay and Lesbian 
Equality Project and at OUT LGBT Well-being and played a leading 
role in advocacy efforts that led to the passing of South Africa’s Civil 
Union Act.  Ms. Judge is presently an associate of Inyathelo: The 
South African Institute for Advancement and serves on the board of 
trustees at Gay and Lesbian Memory in Action (GALA).  She recently 
received her doctorate in women’s and gender studies from the 
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Zethu Matebeni participated in the campaign for same-sex marriage 
through OUT LGBT Well-being and through the Forum for the 
Empowerment of Women (FEW), which focuses on the needs of 
black lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women.  She is currently a 
Senior Researcher at the Institute for Humanities in Africa (HUMA) 
at the University of Cape Town, where she is convener of the Queer in 
Africa series.  She is also a documentary filmmaker and serves on the 
board of trustees at Gay and Lesbian Memory in Action (GALA). 
Fikile Vilakazi played a central role in the same-sex marriage 
movement, first as Advocacy Officer for Lesbian and Gay Equality, 
and then as Advocacy Officer for OUT LGBT Well-being.  During 
the campaign for marriage equality, she also served as Advocacy and 
Public Education Coordinator for the Forum for the Empowerment of 
Women (FEW).  Ms. Vilakazi also held previous positions as Director 
of Secreteriat and Programs Director at the Coalition of African 
Lesbians.  She is presently a doctoral student of social and public 
policy at the University of Jyväskylä in Finland. 
A final interview subject wished to remain anonymous.  Accordingly, 
this Article refers to this individual as Anonymous. 
